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BRD Banque Rwandaise de Developpement
BUL Bidco Uganda Ltd
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SACCO Savings and Credit Co-operative
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SME small and medium-sized enterprise
VCC Village Cocoa Centre
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1 Executive summary 
Markets are central to agriculture and rural 
development. Making markets, value chains 
and the systems that support them work better 
for the poor has therefore become a central 
aim of many donors, governments and non-
governmental organisations. This research seeks 
to understand how public-private-producer 
partnerships (PPPPs) in agricultural value 
chains can be designed and implemented to 
achieve more sustained increases in income 
for smallholder farmers and broader rural 
development. PPPPs involve cooperation 
between government and business agents, 
working together to reach a common goal or 
carry out a specific task, while jointly assuming 
risks and responsibilities, and sharing resources 
and competences.1 They also explicitly involve 
farmers (or producers), hence the fourth ‘P’ 
is added to the more familiar designation of 
‘public-private partnerships’. The research 
also considers the role of PPPP brokers as 
independent facilitators who support the process 
of exploring, designing and implementing PPPPs.
The research is based on four case studies 
of agricultural value chain PPPPs developed 
through projects financed by the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 
Ghana, Indonesia, Rwanda and Uganda. In 
each country, local research teams collected data 
through a mixture of semi-structured interviews, 
field visits and focus group discussions (FGDs) 
with local market chain actors, smallholder 
farmers and other community members, 
and relevant experts. These were not impact 
assessments, and represent instead a snapshot 
in time. However, the aim was to gain insights 
into the outcomes of the PPPPs so far, and how 
these have been influenced by the way the PPPP 
was designed, implemented and brokered. 
 Tea estate in 
Nshili, Nyaruguru, 
just 8 km from the 
Burundi border, 
Rwanda. 
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Case studies
These PPPPs aimed to either bring new small-
scale farmers into the value chain of crops such 
as oil palm and tea, or to improve the terms on 
which farmers were included through better 
access to credit or training. The case studies do 
not involve full impact assessments. However, 
they explore initial outcomes being observed 
in terms of smallholder livelihoods and 
rural development, and how these have been 
influenced by PPPP design and implementation. 
Ghana: The Northern Rural Growth 
Programme involves a series of PPPPs that aim 
to address the challenges facing smallholder 
farmers in northern Ghana. The PPPPs aim to 
improve farmer access to finance, infrastructure, 
production and marketing, by linking small-
scale producers to private sector companies. 
The research focused specifically on the PPPP 
value chain arrangement for maize, which 
is both a staple and a cash crop in northern 
Ghana. Average maize yields rose from 0.8MT/
ha in 2007 to between 1.5MT/ha to 3.2MT/
ha in 2014, boosting household incomes and 
livelihoods in some cases. The PPPP has also 
strengthened vital value chain linkages for 
smallholder farmers, and has given farmers 
more voice although women’s participation was 
low. On the other hand, income stability has 
not improved while high exposure to risk on 
the part of farmers and rural banks threatens 
programme sustainability.
Indonesia: The PPPP in Indonesia evolved 
from the Rural Empowerment and Agricultural 
Development (READ) Programme in Central 
Sulawesi. Cocoa production in the region faced 
serious problems of ageing plants, pests and 
diseases, insufficient improved planting material 
and technologies, and poor farm management 
practices. The READ programme was redesigned 
to include a PPPP with Mars Symbioscience Inc, 
a major cocoa buyer, to establish five Cocoa 
Development Centres (CDCs) supporting 
farmers concerning improved farm management 
techniques. In those areas where the CDC 
model is functioning well, productivity has 
reached 100kg to 200kg per tree per month, up 
from an average of 50kg in 2010. Quality has 
also improved with the average weight of cocoa 
beans increasing by 10 to 15 per cent. However, 
at the time of the fieldwork, most farmers, 
especially in remote districts, were yet to see the 
benefits due to slow CDC development and the 
time lag for improved techniques to raise yields. 
Although 150 key farmers and extension agents 
have been trained, they still require ongoing 
technical support from Mars, raising questions 
of long-term sustainability.
Rwanda: The case study in Rwanda involves 
PPPPs in two tea estates in the southern 
province of the country, one in Nshili and 
one in Mushubi. These PPPPs were designed 
and implemented as part of the government’s 
privatisation of the tea sector. The aim of the 
PPPPs was to secure substantial public and 
private sector investment to drive an increase 
in smallholder incomes and generate new 
employment opportunities in tea-growing 
regions in marginalised areas of the country. 
Tea growers have increased their incomes, 
households are investing in assets, food security 
has improved and in a region where up to 40 per 
cent of the labour force previously would migrate 
to seek work, a large number of permanent 
and seasonal jobs has been created. However, 
yields of green leaf of 0.7T/ha/year in 2013 in 
Nshili and 2.5T/ha/year in 2013 in Mushubi 
are still well below the expectations of 6 to 7T/
ha/year, due to poor maintenance of plots and 
weak farmer commitment and ownership. Low 
productivity is undermining the sustainability 
of farmer loans and leaving factories operating 
well below nominal capacity – 30 per cent in 
Mushubi and 40 per cent in Nshili.
Uganda: The PPPP in Uganda aimed to 
establish oil palm production (a new cash crop 
in Uganda) through private sector-led agro-
industrial development in Kalangala District on 
Bugala Island in Lake Victoria. Specific aims of 
the PPPP were to achieve import substitution of 
edible oil, raise smallholder incomes, improve 
population health through increased uptake 
of vegetable oil, and diversify exports. Farmers 
who have started harvesting have benefited 
from improved incomes and income stability, 
enabling households to meet basic health and 
education needs, and invest in assets. Significant 
investments in public infrastructure such as 
roads and water transport have also benefited 
local communities, with more than 80 per cent 
of farms now reported to be linked to the road 
network, and a new ferry service to the island. 
However, unintended consequences include 
conflict linked to changing land tenure rights 
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and gender roles, and questions over long-term 
food security. The PPPP also experienced major 
delays and additional costs due to limited 
engagement by smallholders and public 
opposition, especially early on, and government 
difficulties in acquiring sufficient land. 
Eight enabling factors
The analysis of these PPPPs was based on three 
aspects that were identified as influencing the 
ability of PPPPs to successfully deliver 
development outcomes: (a) the rationale for the 
PPPP – what were the constraints that the PPPP 
sought to overcome and why did partnership 
present a solution which neither the public 
nor private sectors could achieve alone; 
(b) partnership dynamics including ownership, 
involvement and interdependence of all partners, 
governance mechanisms linked to transparency, 
accountability and trust, risk management, 
communication and dialogue, and monitoring 
and evaluation; and (c) the role of partnership 
brokers. From this analysis, eight enabling factors 
for PPPPs in agricultural value chains emerged.
1 Define the rationale and underlying 
assumptions. PPPPs should have a clear 
rationale, responding to the key questions ‘what 
is the constraint to be overcome?’ and ‘how will 
working with the private sector overcome this 
constraint?’. Potential partners with the right 
competencies need to be identified, e.g. through 
competitive bidding, partner due diligence 
processes, or working with already established 
partners. Assumptions behind the rationale and 
proposed solutions need to be identified and 
feasibility tested.
2 Ensure a clear market pull. Value chain 
PPPPs offer the specific opportunity to 
secure market access for smallholder farmers 
by connecting them directly with markets. 
Outcomes will depend on aspects of design, 
including risk-sharing and mechanisms that 
address unequal power relations that exist in 
vertically coordinated value chains.
3 Prioritise farmer ownership of the PPPP. 
The PPPP is a partnership, not only of public 
and private sectors, but also of farmers. For 
PPPPs to be successful, all partners, including 
farmers, need to have ownership of the PPPP, 
with clear roles and responsibilities that reflect 
their priorities and interests. 
4 Align incentives of partners and build 
trust. Agreements are needed to create incentives 
for partners to perform their intended roles 
– and to feel confident that the other partners 
will perform their roles. Incentives are most 
fully aligned when all partners own the PPPP 
objectives and where each has something to lose 
if the objectives are not achieved. Building trust 
between parties who are not used to working 
together or thinking of each other as partners 
– or who have a history of poor relationships – 
requires significant leadership from within the 
partnership organisations or from brokers.
5 Manage risks through identification, 
distribution and mitigation. Unless risk 
is managed, the weakest value chain actors 
(normally the farmers) bear a disproportionate 
share, and this can also raise costs and 
undermine the sustainability of the PPPP as a 
whole. PPPP design should firstly identify risks 
and how risks are distributed. Mechanisms are 
then needed to manage, mitigate or share risk, 
avoiding an excessive unmitigated risk burden 
on one party. 
6 Build the capacity to respond to changes in 
complex market systems. Agricultural markets 
consist of many individual but interdependent 
parts, with the dynamics of the system emerging 
from interactions between these parts. PPPP 
interventions may lead to unforeseen outcomes 
– challenges as well as opportunities. PPPPs 
need mechanisms to identify these changes, 
and the flexibility to respond and adapt to 
the unexpected. This includes performance 
monitoring, with indicators that reflect joint 
PPPP objectives, and spaces for communication, 
negotiation and conflict resolution.
7 Take a proactive approach to public 
accountability and transparency. The 
impacts of PPPPs frequently extend beyond 
direct partners to a wider group of external 
stakeholders. The larger the scale of PPPP 
activities and its likely impacts, the more 
important it is to proactively identify and 
address negative externalities, engaging and 
involving potentially affected stakeholders.  
8 Facilitate sustainable market systems. 
Agricultural value chain PPPPs are time-
limited interventions to establish new market, 
institutional or systemic arrangements that 
address underlying constraints in areas such as 
input markets, credit systems and technology 
diffusion. Interventions need to focus on actions 
that modify the incentives, capabilities and 
behaviour of different actors to ensure that they 
will continue their roles in the long term.
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Role of brokers
Drawing on the enabling factors and the roles 
of brokers identified through the case studies, 
the findings also identify key roles that brokers 
can fulfil, supporting different steps of the PPPP 
process. They can: 
• facilitate contact between potential partners, 
helping them explore the potential benefits of 
partnership, identify common objectives and 
build trust and understanding;
• ask the right questions early on, identify 
and justify assumptions and ensure effective 
feasibility studies; 
• provide or procure technical expertise as 
needed;
• involve farmers directly as partners in the 
PPPP, building farmer capacity to organise 
effectively, access information and negotiate 
a fair deal;
• help ensure transparency and dialogue within 
the PPPP, and between the PPPP and external 
stakeholders;
• support monitoring processes, facilitate 
dialogue around conflicts or differences, and 
encourage partners to develop and own joint 
solutions;
• ensure actors have long-term capacity, 
financing and incentives to play new roles.
Brokers also need to develop a clear exit 
strategy from the outset. Otherwise the risk 
is that brokers become part of how PPPP 
implementation works, creating dependence, 
particularly on the part of the less powerful 
partners.
Discussion of findings
While the four case studies point overall to 
the potential for PPPPs to deliver positive 
development outcomes, the jury is still out in 
terms of the long-term impacts on poverty and 
rural development. This evidence gap is not 
particular to IFAD, and many of the criticisms 
of PPPPs and other value chain approaches 
are linked to perceptions that claims of 
positive outcomes are not substantiated by the 
evidence. There is a need for the public sector, 
including donors, to invest more in creating a 
solid evidence base that identifies the impacts 
of PPPPs over the long term and measures 
broader impacts (positive and negative) beyond 
participating farmers.
Despite this evidence gap, PPPPs remain 
popular because they promise better 
development outcomes from the involvement of 
the public sector, and more commercially viable 
results through the involvement of the private 
sector. Yet this research highlights that just 
securing the involvement of public and private 
actors is not enough to achieve these goals. 
Strong government ownership of the PPPP did 
not emerge as a key enabling factor to improve 
the livelihoods of farmers, which depends more 
on the way the PPPP is designed, including 
especially the role of the ‘fourth P’ (producers). 
It may, however, generate wider, horizontal 
impacts that benefit those who are unlikely to 
be reached by private sector value chains.
Nor does involving the private sector 
guarantee long-term commercial viability. 
Indeed, sustainability and scalability are 
also challenges for company-led ‘inclusive 
business’ approaches. The risk with both 
company-led and PPPP approaches is that 
the effort invested to ensure the success of 
pilot projects undermines the ability to reach 
commercial scale, particularly for ‘greenfield’ 
interventions supporting smallholders to enter 
new value chains (Vorley and Thorpe 2014). In 
this respect, the PPPP in Ghana – although not 
without challenges – offers a promising model 
since it works through already existing market 
systems, influencing the behaviour of different 
market actors (through partnerships but also 
other modes of engagement) to overcome 
constraints faced by farmers. Approaches that 
work to improve existing market systems offer 
the potential for large-scale impact through 
reaching diffuse beneficiaries, but intensify the 
challenge of measuring impact and attributing 
it to programme interventions. However, 
methodologies do exist that can support the 
evaluation of system-level changes.2 
Overall, the conclusion is that agricultural value 
chain PPPPs are a variation on, rather than 
a radical departure from, other value chain 
approaches, bringing similar opportunities 
but also similar challenges. The enabling 
factors and PPPP checklist set out in this report 
support partners and brokers to design and 
implement PPPPs in ways that can lead to better 
development outcomes. More evidence is still 
needed, however, around the long-term impacts 
of PPPPs for both smallholder livelihoods and 
broader rural development.
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2 Introduction 
Markets are central to agriculture and rural 
development. Making markets, value chains 
and the systems that support them work 
better for the poor has therefore become a 
central aim of many donors, governments 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
(Elliott et al. 2008; Tschumi and Hagen 2008; 
Jochnick 2012; Heinrich 2013). This research 
focuses on one mechanism – public-private-
producer partnerships (PPPPs) – through which 
development actors work with companies to 
improve the way that agricultural markets work 
for small-scale farmers and rural communities. 
The term ‘PPPP’ (rather than the more usual 
‘PPP’ – public-private partnerships) is chosen 
to underscore the role of farmers as part of 
the partnerships (see page 8 for definitions). 
The research seeks to understand how PPPPs 
can be designed and implemented in order 
to bring more sustained increases in income 
for smallholder farmers and broader rural 
development. To do so, it explores four 
agricultural value chain PPPPs supported 
by the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) in Ghana, Indonesia, 
Rwanda and Uganda in order to derive lessons 
for more robust and systematic approaches.3 
The research takes a development perspective, 
and is directed at those in the public sector, 
including governments and donors, that are 
initiating or engaging in partnerships (PPPs 
or PPPPs). However, agricultural PPPs are not 
only instigated by the public sector. Companies 
are both collaborators in and instigators of 
partnerships, in order to secure the supply of 
commodities, ensure food safety standards 
are met or as part of their ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ (Bitzer et al. 2009). Companies 
work through partnerships in order to access 
 Kalangala 
island. A truck 
distributes young 
oil palm plants 
to farmers on 
the island.
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public sector funding, skills and expertise, 
and to share risks (Kindornay et al. 2012). The 
findings of this research are relevant to both 
public and private sector-led partnerships, 
though with the aim of maximising 
development benefit. 
Background
Agriculture is a private sector activity. The 
trading of agricultural produce, whether 
through local markets or across international 
trade networks, resides largely in the hands 
of private individuals and enterprises. With 
notable exceptions,4 the state role in agriculture, 
through agricultural extension, research and 
development, infrastructure and finance, is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, dating back no 
more than 200 years. However, in these areas 
that are considered public responsibilities, 
governments are now seeking to leverage private 
sector resources – both technical and financial 
– and to work with the private sector to secure 
access to markets for smallholder producers. 
Development cooperation partnerships first 
came to public attention at the United Nations 
World Summit for Sustainable Development 
in 2002. But the real growth in interest has 
been in the last few years. For members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee, for example, spending 
through public-private mechanisms has risen 
from US$234m in 2007 to US$903m in 2010, 
emphasising health (40.9 per cent), economic 
infrastructure (31.8 per cent), agriculture (15.2 
per cent), and environmental protection (6 per 
cent) (Tomlinson 2012). At the Fourth High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan 
in 2011, PPPs in development cooperation 
received significant attention. In 2013, the G8 
launched the ‘New Alliance for Food Security 
and Nutrition’, a ‘mega-PPP’ designed to foster 
joint African government, donor and private 
sector commitments to agricultural investment 
and policy reform. Despite this growing 
interest, however, many interventions are still 
at the ‘proof-of-concept’ stage (Poulton and 
Macartney 2012).
What is a ‘public-private’ or a ‘public-
private-producer’ partnership?
There is no single agreed definition of a 
public-private partnership. The term is used 
to refer to a variety of arrangements including 
sometimes quite informal agreements between 
public and private sector entities, such as 
knowledge-sharing networks. For this research, 
the following definition is used:
PPPs involve cooperation between 
government and business agents that agree 
to work together to reach a common goal 
or carry out a specific task, while jointly 
assuming risks and responsibilities, and 
sharing resources and competences.5
Captured in this definition is the sense of a 
unique relationship between the government 
and a private firm. While the government retains 
ultimate responsibility, the private sector is a 
partner in both decision-making and delivery. 
Importantly, PPPs can be distinguished from 
other relationships between public and private 
sectors (e.g. public procurement) based on 
whether a sufficient amount of risk has been 
transferred (OECD 2008).
Many different types of PPPs in agriculture 
have been identified (Ferroni and Castle 
2011; Narrod et al. 2009; Spielman et al. 2010; 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011), such as 
those developed to build required infrastructure; 
to collaborate on agricultural research and 
development (R&D) or crop markets; to deliver 
(normally public) services, such as extension 
services; or to create value chain linkages either 
bringing smallholders into new value chains 
or improving existing chain linkages through 
overcoming high costs or risks associated 
with sourcing from smallholders. Since this 
last form of partnership explicitly involves 
farmers (or producers) as a key component 
of the arrangements being created, they can 
be considered ‘public-private-producer’ 
partnerships (PPPPs).
The PPPPs explored in this research are 
primarily focused on value chain linkages 
(Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda), although in 
Indonesia the focus is on extension and 
agricultural technology. These partnerships 
often include other elements (e.g. development 
of infrastructure, access to finance). However 
the private sector role focuses on value chain 
development or strengthening and agricultural 
technology. 
INTRODUCTION8
Methodology 
The objective of the research is to identify 
the key factors driving the effectiveness of 
PPPPs at bringing sustained increases in 
income for smallholder farmers at scale and 
delivering positive development outcomes 
across rural communities. To provide insight 
into this overarching question, four case studies 
were selected and then analysed based on the 
following questions:
a. What constraints was the PPPP set up 
to overcome, and what was its theory of 
change?
b. What were the key features of how the 
PPPP was brokered, designed and 
implemented? 
c. What have been the development outcomes 
for smallholders and rural communities to 
date?
d. How have these outcomes been influenced 
by the PPPP’s brokering, design and 
implementation? 
Case study selection
The four case studies were selected from 
among a sample of 24 IFAD project-supported 
PPPPs (IFAD 2013). The longlist of PPPPs 
was mapped against two functional elements 
of the partnership with the private sector: (a) 
the main focus of the partnership, based on 
how the PPPP sought to deliver improvements 
in farmer livelihoods and rural development; 
and (b) the process for identifying the private 
sector partner – whether a structured or semi-
structured process6 was in place, or whether a 
more opportunistic approach7 was used which 
largely responded to events.
Projects were selected with the aim of arriving 
at a set of five projects with maximum 
variation in the sample. However, practical 
considerations in terms of the IFAD country 
team interest in and availability for the 
research meant that in the end, no cases 
were available in two of the areas (‘financial 
Focus Financial 
sector 
development
Commodity 
value chain 
development
Support smallholder production Support other 
market actors 
(rural traders, 
SMEs)
Process 
to identify 
partner
Structured or 
semi-structured
Structured or 
semi-structured
Structured or 
semi-structured
Unstructured/ 
opportunistic
Structured or 
semi-structured
Number of 
IFAD projects
3 6 5 6 4
Countries 
selected
Armenia8 Rwanda
Uganda
Ghana Indonesia –
 A farmer at the 
MARS Cocoa 
Development 
Center (CDC), in 
Sidole, Central 
Sulawesi, 
Indonesia.
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INTRODUCTION
sector development’ and ‘support other 
market actors’). Instead, one additional case 
was selected in ‘commodity value chain 
development’, the newest and potentially more 
innovative area of IFAD work. In the end, 
therefore, the cases represent:
• commodity value chain development: 
Rwanda and Uganda;
• support smallholder production: Ghana 
(structured/semi-structured process to select 
partners) and Indonesia (unstructured 
process / opportunistic approach).
In each country, local research teams collected 
data through a mixture of semi-structured 
interviews, field visits and focus group 
discussions (FGDs), and a review of secondary 
research and data, supplemented and validated 
through stakeholder meetings at the start and 
end of the project. Participants for interviews 
were selected purposively from the range of 
PPPP stakeholders, including local market 
chain actors, smallholder farmers and other 
community members, and relevant experts. 
FGDs were conducted with participating 
smallholders (with different groups for men and 
women smallholders), peer groups (i.e. wider 
members of the same communities that were 
not participating in the PPPP) and comparison 
communities which were unaffected by the 
PPPP, using a mixture of purposeful (generally 
to select areas or districts) and random 
(generally to select individual communities) 
sampling. Wherever possible, the qualitative 
data from the fieldwork was triangulated by 
the researchers to mitigate bias and ensure 
the validity and reliability of findings, and 
supplemented by quantitative data from 
secondary sources, largely IFAD monitoring and 
project review reports. 
The country studies were not impact assessments, 
and in most cases, it is too early to judge the 
full impacts. They represent instead a snapshot 
in time, in terms of how the lives of farmers 
and their communities are changing. However, 
it was important in the research not only to 
understand the process around the design and 
implementation of the PPPPs, but to have some 
insights into the outcomes of the PPPPs so far 
for different community members, and how 
these have been influenced by the way the PPPP 
was designed, implemented and brokered. 
Report outline
This report is a synthesis of four case studies 
of IFAD project-supported PPPPs in Ghana, 
Indonesia, Rwanda and Uganda. The next 
section presents the analytical approach to the 
case studies, based on existing literature on 
PPPPs, as well as discussions with practitioners 
involved in or brokering partnerships.9 The 
following section presents a brief summary 
of the key features of the four PPPPs10 and 
the results of the fieldwork. Drawing on this 
learning, eight enabling factors that support 
agricultural value chain PPPPs for rural 
development are identified and presented. 
Finally the report offers a PPPP checklist, 
outlining the role for brokers in the process, 
before drawing conclusions from the research.
10
 A farmer in 
a maize field.
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APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
3 Approach to analysis 
The four PPPPs were analysed based on three 
aspects: (a) the rationale for the PPPP – what 
were the constraints the PPPP sought to 
overcome and why did the partnership seem 
to present a solution which neither public 
nor private sectors could achieve alone; 
(b) partnership dynamics linked to PPPP 
design and implementation; and (c) the 
role of partnership brokers. Within all three 
aspects, the underlying interest is improving 
development outcomes for smallholder farmers 
and rural communities. 
The rationale for public-
private-producer partnerships
Public intervention in markets is usually 
justified because constraints are preventing an 
‘efficient’ outcome from occurring – a market 
exchange that would raise overall social welfare. 
Public intervention may also be justified on 
equity grounds – that markets are not delivering 
equitable outcomes or reducing poverty 
(Department for International Development 
2005). Constraints arise in markets due to 
market failures, such as missing markets for 
credit or inputs; institutional barriers, such as 
poor contract enforcement norms; and systemic 
weaknesses in market exchange, including the 
inability of agents to learn about each other, 
identify areas of complementarity, and build 
and sustain trust (Spielman et al. 2010).
Market constraints to smallholder inclusion
Market constraints related to smallholder 
farmers are particularly acute because of 
asymmetric information (e.g. between 
companies and farmers), high transaction 
costs leading to coordination failure, scale 
diseconomies, missing or underdeveloped 
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markets, undeveloped infrastructure and 
monopoly or near monopoly power often held 
by other actors in the value chain (World Bank 
2007; Poulton et al. 2006). The following are 
four specific areas where smallholder farmers in 
agricultural value chains in developing countries 
commonly face constraints (Bitzer et al. 2009).
• Access to technology: Technological and 
managerial innovations required to engage in 
formal value chains, which may not be met 
by government extension services. 
• Access to finance: Smallholder farmers are 
often not considered credit-worthy because 
they lack collateral, an assured income 
and/or have poor reputations for contract 
compliance.
• Access to markets: The absence of 
sufficient market demand for crops 
produced, collapsing local market prices 
or inaccessibility of markets with high 
distribution costs. 
• Lack of farmer organisation: Small-scale 
farmers face scale diseconomies leading to 
high transaction costs in accessing inputs and 
markets, obtaining access to information, 
technology and finance, and weak 
bargaining power. 
PPPPs do not only entail public sector 
intervention in markets. They also involve 
companies in public sector activities, such as 
extension services. PPPPs are often criticised 
for introducing profit-driven actors into these 
activities (De Clerck et al. 2012; Heinrich 2013); 
however, the rationale for a private sector role 
is generally on quality or efficiency grounds, 
or to create market arrangements that will be 
sustainable after public sector support ends 
(Heinrich 2013). 
Partnership dynamics during 
design and implementation
Despite the attractions of partnership, 
different cultures, languages, incentives and 
straightforward mistrust can lead them to fail. 
Much has been written on the dynamics of 
development partnerships (Brickell and Elias 
2013; Ferroni and Castle 2011; Drost et al. 
2012; Heinrich 2013; Brinkerhoff 2002; OECD 
2008; Van Huijstee et al. 2007), though not 
all are specific to PPPPs. Elements commonly 
identified as critical for successful partnership 
are:
• Ownership and involvement of all 
partners based on jointly agreed objectives, 
with clear roles and responsibilities, and 
mechanisms through which the interests of 
partners can be represented.
• Interdependence where the interests of 
different partners align around a shared 
objective (while recognising that partners 
continue to have differing underlying 
interests), based on formal and informal 
mechanisms that align the exchange and use 
of resources between the partners. 
• Governance mechanisms with processes 
to provide transparency, ensure 
accountability and foster and maintain 
trust.
• Risk management, which includes 
reallocation of risk between partners as well 
as risk prevention and mitigation.
• Clear and transparent communication 
through formal and informal spaces 
 Farmers weed 
sunflower plants 
in Uganda.
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for dialogue, shared planning and 
decision-making. 
• Monitoring and evaluation, with indicators 
based on expected results, leading to adaptation 
of the partnership to improve results. 
Partnership brokers
A PPPP ‘broker’ is an independent facilitator 
during the PPPP process. The partnership 
literature is relatively thin on the role of 
brokers but points to exploring the feasibility 
of the partnership, introducing partners, 
building trust and supporting the negotiation 
of the partnership agreement as key roles 
(Warner 2009). Brokers can also help to 
maintain the effectiveness of the PPPP during 
implementation by helping partners to respond 
to changes in the external context on an 
ongoing basis. The role can require considerable 
technical skills in negotiation and design of 
effective arrangements and business models, 
as well as an understanding of the different 
cultures and motivations of partners. 
Someone trusted from one of the parties 
can play the role of broker. For example, the 
government can broker the relationship between 
farmers and a company as part of a three-way 
(public-private-farmer) partnership. However, 
it is more often an external and independent 
actor, like an NGO or donor, which acts as a 
broker. Within the same partnership, different 
actors can be brokers at different points in 
the evolution of the partnership, or between 
different partners. 
Development outcomes for 
smallholders and rural 
communities
At the heart of the analysis around public-
private partnerships are questions around 
results. In the case of agricultural PPPPs in the 
development sector, this means improvements 
to the lives of rural communities, through 
improved access to income-generating activities 
or improved food security, for example. 
Potential benefits that have been ascribed 
to agricultural value chain PPPPs include 
encouraging investment with high social returns, 
improving the function of input markets, new 
and better outlets for smallholders’ products, 
enabling risks and resources to be better shared, 
promoting economic growth and (in some 
cases) ensuring a fair share of gains is captured 
(Poulton and Macartney 2012; Bitzer et al. 2009; 
Fairtrade Foundation 2014; Abdulsamad et al. 
2015). However, most studies note that data on 
outcomes and impacts are limited.
However, PPPPs have also faced substantial 
criticism. Significant concerns have been 
expressed that the top-down and business-
driven nature of many partnerships privileges 
business interests, while poor farmers and 
marginalised communities are either excluded 
or included on unfavourable terms (Bendell 
et al. 2010; Blowfield 2007; Heinrich 2013; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands 
2013; Lund-Thomsen 2009; Reed and Reed 
2009; Utting and Zammit 2009). Exclusion 
comes because commercial incentives and 
the difficulties of working with often widely 
dispersed smallholders mean that value chains 
involve more organised, asset-ready and 
geographically accessible farmers. Inclusion on 
unfavourable terms results from value chains 
that reinforce captive relationships in which 
smallholders are unable to exit, or which leave 
them bearing unsustainable risk related to 
debt financing, environmental degradation 
and reliance on a single buyer (Willoughby 
2014; Abdulsamad et al. 2015). The risk is not 
only the exclusion or unfavourable inclusion 
in value chains, but also that the public sector 
will withdraw its activities from communities 
that are not part of the value chain, on either 
the belief or the pretence that the market is 
providing solutions. 
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4 Case studies 
Introduction
The research explored the design and 
implementation of four IFAD project-supported 
PPPPs, and how this affected the outcomes 
being observed in terms of smallholder 
livelihoods and rural development. These four 
case studies, in Ghana, Indonesia, Rwanda 
and Uganda (see Table 4.1 for an overview), 
all involved an arrangement between one or 
more private companies and a government-run 
implementing unit, which was responsible 
to the relevant government department, 
usually the Ministry of Agriculture. All the 
arrangements also involved smallholder 
producer organisations as the third partner. 
IFAD – alongside others such as NGOs – acted 
as a broker. IFAD also provided funding to 
the government partner. All the PPPPs aimed 
to either bring new small-scale farmers into 
the value chains of crops such as maize, oil 
palm and tea, or to improve the terms on 
which farmers were included through better 
access to credit or training (Table 5.1). 
Ghana Indonesia Rwanda Uganda
Region Northern Ghana Central Sulawesi Southern province
(Nshili and Mushubi)
Kalangala District, 
Bugala Island
Commodity Maize Cocoa Tea Oil palm
IFAD-funded 
programme
NRGP READ PDCRE
PRICE
VODP
Dates 2008–16 2008–14 
(reformulated in 
2011 to include 
PPPP)
PDCRE: 2003–11 
(reformulated in 
2005 to include PPPP)
PRICE: 
2011–present
Phase 1: 
1997–2012
Phase 2: 
2012–18
Table 4.1: Case study overview
Ghana
Rwanda
Indonesia
Uganda
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Ghana11 
The Northern Rural Growth Programme (NRGP), 
implemented by the Government of Ghana 
and supported by IFAD, involves a series of 
PPPPs that aim to address the challenges facing 
smallholder farmers in northern Ghana. These 
include limited access to inputs and services, low 
productivity and low prices. The PPPPs aim to 
improve farmer access to finance, infrastructure, 
production and marketing, by linking the private 
sector to small-scale producers of maize, shea 
nut, butternut squash or soybeans. This research 
focused specifically on the PPPP value chain 
arrangements for maize, which is both a staple 
and a cash crop in northern Ghana.
PPPP agreements
The PPPP has agreements at two different levels, 
creating and building the capacity of farmer-
based organisations (FBOs) and linking them to 
other stakeholders in the chain: 
1. A fairly informal agreement between NRGP 
and the end buyers (Nestle or Akate Farms). 
Nestle provides training for extension 
workers related to quality and food safety 
and, indirectly, purchases crops produced 
by FBOs. Akate Farms purchases crops 
directly from the institutional aggregator, 
Savannah Farmers Marketing Company 
(SFMC).12 Nestle (but not Akate Farms) has a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
the government.
2. A formal purchasing arrangement between 
the FBOs and SFMC. This arrangement fosters 
access to credit for FBOs through a ‘cashless 
credit system’. 
The status of smallholder farmers in the 
PPPP is unclear. Farmers’ organisations 
are represented in the District Value Chain 
Committees, yet there is a perception (including 
among some farmers themselves) that they are 
‘recipients’ rather than active partners involved 
in decision-making during the programme 
planning and design phase.
New institutional arrangements created 
1. District Value Chain Committees have been 
set up, with support from ACDEP, an NGO, 
to coordinate actors in the value chain, 
including FBOs, input and service providers 
and aggregators. They support the ‘cashless 
credit system’ and improve farm access to 
credit, inputs and services.
2. The ‘cashless credit system’ allows 
smallholders to receive inputs or services; the 
providers of which are paid directly by rural 
banks at a price agreed in the District Value 
Chain Committees. These loans are repaid to 
the banks when farmers sell the produce. 
Results
The PPPP has enabled smallholder farmers to 
produce more and better quality maize. Maize 
productivity is estimated on average to have more 
than doubled. Average yields rose from 0.8MT/ha 
Case study continues 
over page 
 A farmer 
working in a 
maize field.
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in 2007 in the northern regions to between 
1.5MT/ha to 3.2MT/ha in 2014.13 The sale of 
surplus maize has boosted household incomes 
and livelihoods in some cases,14 though income 
stability has not improved since crop yields can 
vary from season to season and the aggregator 
has not been consistent in buying maize. 
The establishment of FBOs and the District 
Value Chain Committees bringing together 
all actors in the local maize value chain has 
established vital linkages for smallholder 
farmers and has given them more secure output 
markets, although women’s participation in 
FBOs and District Value Chain Committees was 
low. The cashless credit system has given them 
access to improved inputs and mechanisation 
services. Twenty-four rural banks (which had 
previously been reluctant to lend to smallholder 
farmers) were participating at the time of the 
fieldwork, from a starting base of two. It has 
also given farmers more voice through their 
participation in the committees, which also 
provides a channel for local arbitration of 
conflicts and promotes greater transparency in 
setting prices for inputs and outputs. 
However, high exposure to risk on the part of 
farmers and rural banks threatens programme 
sustainability. At the time of the fieldwork, 
recovery of the past season agricultural 
production loans was slow, and one leading 
rural bank had decided not to offer agricultural 
PPPP objective Improve productivity and quality of maize in Northern Ghana
Smallholder 
inclusion
Smallholder constraints addressed What solution did the PPPP create?
Access to finance and technology,  
farmer organisation
• DVCC to link smallholder farmers to facilitate 
access to credit and inputs
• Enhanced access to technology, provided 
from Nestle through the government
• Creation of FBOs
Partners
Private sector Public sector Farmers
SFMC (domestic company), 
Nestle (MNC)
Others linked informally 
(e.g. Akate Farms)
Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (through 
NRPG) and Department of 
Cooperatives
FBOs formed by government
Roles
• Nestle: provision of 
training materials
• SFMC: aggregates 
maize from smallholders 
and supplies to end 
users; source for 
payback arrangement 
under cashless credit 
system
• Formation of FBOs 
supported by the NGO 
ACDEP to provide training 
on group formation
• Facilitate DVCCs and 
cashless credit system
• FBOs are members of the 
DVCCs
• Farmers provide maize 
to SFMC (but also sell to 
traders)
Brokering
• IFAD: Loan funding, technical support, monitoring and evaluation, policy dialogue, facilitates 
contacts to possible new partners
• ACDEP: Capacity building with farmers and DVCCs, conflict resolution
• NRPG: Has the trust and confidence of the companies, conflict resolution
PPPP 
arrangements
New institutional arrangement created New roles that need to be sustained
• Cashless credit system 
• DVCC 
• FBOs, input and service providers and 
aggregators manage DVCCs
• Farmers, input and service providers, 
aggregators and rural banks participate in 
cashless credit system
Table 4.2: Ghana PPPP overview
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loans for the 2014/15 cropping year. The 
cashless credit system is also hampered by 
limitations placed by the Bank of Ghana on the 
percentage of rural banks’ loan portfolio that 
can be unsecured. 
Key learning 
• Innovative governance mechanisms. 
The District Value Chain Committee 
(DVCC) promotes trust and the sharing of 
information between value chain actors, 
facilitated by an external broker (ACDEP 
in this case). It provides a space to share 
and access transparent information around 
input or service prices and supports the 
‘cashless credit system’, giving rural banks 
greater confidence in working with farmers. 
• Risk management. It is vital to identify 
and quantify the risks facing each 
stakeholder in PPPP arrangements, so 
that mechanisms for appropriate sharing of 
risks can be developed. The high exposure 
to risk on the part of farmers and rural 
banks in Ghana has threatened programme 
sustainability. 
Government of 
Ghana
Nestlé
(indirect 
buyer)
Domestic 
market
(weaning foods)
Domestic 
market
(animal feed)
Akate Farms
(direct buyer)
SFMC
(aggregator)
IFAD
NRGP
DVCC 
(one per district)
DVCC 
(one per district)
Agreem
ent signed
M
oU
Maize
Maize
Contracts signed 
with FBOs
Maize
Broker
(1) Number of representatives and DVCCs shown as an illustrative example.
P
ub
lic S
ecto
r
P
rivate S
ecto
r
(1)
ACDEP
(supporting NGO)
DVCC 
(one per district)
DVCC 
(one per district)
Implementing 
agent/broker
New institutional 
arrangement 
created
Farmers’ 
organisation
Final market
Private sector
Ownership
Undefined 
produce channel 
via local traders
Defined produce 
channel
Agreement 
(no clear roles/
responsibilities)
Signed agreement
Support
(technical/financial)
Public sector
LegendFigure 4.1: PPPP arrangement in maize value chain in Ghana
DVCC
Farmer-based 
organisations
(maize producers)
Private sector
(service providers, 
financial 
institutions)
Government
(e.g. Department 
of Cooperatives)
Poverty is there but the community will never 
go hungry again — [Why?] We have access 
to fertiliser, tractor services, good seeds now 
compared to previous tools which were cutlass and 
hoe and no modern inputs. We have a dam and 
did not know how to use it. Now people do dry 
season farming and there is food throughout 
the year. 
Men’s focus group discussion
This year (2013/14) FBO repayments are poor. 
The bank believes some actors did not do their 
work. Monitoring was bad which could have 
helped solve some of the problem. 
Participating rural bank
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Indonesia15 
The PPPP in Indonesia evolved from an 
existing government programme, the Rural 
Empowerment and Agricultural Development 
(READ) programme (2009–14), implemented 
by the Government of Indonesia and supported 
by IFAD in Central Sulawesi. Cocoa production 
in the region faced serious problems of ageing 
plants, pests and diseases, insufficient improved 
planting material and technologies, and poor 
farm management practices. Neither the READ 
programme nor supporting units, such as the 
government’s Extension Agency, had sufficient 
expertise to resolve these challenges. 
The READ programme was redesigned to include 
a PPPP with Mars Symbioscience Inc, a major 
cocoa buyer in the region, to establish five Cocoa 
Development Centres (CDCs) for training on 
improved cocoa farm management techniques 
to overcome low cocoa productivity. The PPPP 
design is based on the CDC model and cocoa 
cultivation technology developed by Mars in South 
Sulawesi. The PPPP, which is the focus of the 
research, sits within a much broader redesigned 
READ programme (not covered by the research).
PPPP agreements
The government and Mars have a contract 
and MoU where they agree to work towards 
improving cocoa productivity, which is also 
expected to improve farmer welfare. Mars 
provides the technology package, trains key 
farmers and extension workers, and provides 
technical assistance; the government develops 
the infrastructure, provides extension workers, 
organises farmer groups and builds capacity 
among them, and offers farmer financing via 
a revolving loan fund. The farmer groups also 
receive assistance from a facilitator (NGO) 
on group management, communication and 
accounting.
IFAD played a crucial role in developing these 
relationships, in a context of generally low 
trust between public and private sectors in the 
country. IFAD identified a private partner that it 
trusted and had the right skills and resources to 
offer, and acted as a broker to build trust.
New institutional arrangements created 
The key institutions are the CDCs and 
associated Village Cocoa Centres (VCCs) 
at farmer group (village) level. The CDCs 
are the key infrastructure for technology 
delivery, establishing demonstration cocoa 
gardens, and monitoring and supporting 
the VCCs at farmer-group level. The CDCs 
are under the authority and management 
of the government’s District Management 
Units, and all ‘key farmers’ and extension 
 An 
extension 
worker 
demonstrates 
side grafting 
on cocoa trees 
for farmers 
at a Cocoa 
Development 
Center (CDC) 
in Central 
Sulawesi, 
Indonesia.
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workers who receive training through the 
system are coordinated by the CDCs. The 
VCCs are the training and experimentation 
ground for farmer groups where key farmers 
and extension agents apply their skill and 
other farmers can learn. There are 200 VCCs 
developed and operating in the project area. 
There is no marketing element to the PPPP, 
and most farmers still sell to local collectors 
at village or sub-district level due to frequent 
marketing of small harvest volumes and the 
fact they owe money to the collector. Currently, 
cocoa prices are high, but there is a risk that 
marketing could become a problem in the 
future. The next phase of the programme will 
address marketing aspects. 
Results
The implementation of the PPPP has been 
uneven. In those areas where the CDC/VCC 
model is functioning well, there is a strong 
technology chain to farmers leading to 
improvements in productivity, technical 
knowledge and quality. Productivity has reached 
100kg to 200kg per tree per month. Even 
though this is below optimal levels,16 it 
represents a significant increase since 2010, 
when productivity averaged 50kg per tree per 
month. The average weight of cocoa beans has 
increased by 10 to 15 per cent.
Women’s participation in cocoa farming 
activities (seedling production and cocoa 
maintenance) has increased. However, the 
research did not establish whether women saw 
income benefits from this additional work, 
and how this was balanced with other, 
pre-existing responsibilities.
However, at the time of the fieldwork, most 
farmers were yet to see the benefits. Many were 
still growing the seed, or had trees just at the 
flowering stage. Slow CDC development in some 
Table 4.3: Indonesia PPPP overview
PPPP objective Improve cocoa productivity and retention of farmers in the cocoa sector
Smallholder 
inclusion
Smallholder constraints addressed What solution did the PPPP create?
Access to finance and technology,  
farmer organisation
System to disseminate improved cocoa 
technology to extension workers and key 
farmers
Partners
Private sector Public sector Farmers
Mars (MNC) Ministry of Agriculture (through 
READ programme)
Farmer organisations (FOs) 
focused on cocoa, formed by 
the government
Roles
Provide training to lead 
farmers and extension 
workers, and technical 
assistance to CDCs in five 
districts
• Formation of FOs focused 
on cocoa, with support and 
services provided by an NGO 
• Provide extension agents 
for training, and create 
CDC/VCC infrastructure
FOs operate the Village Cocoa 
Centres (VCCs)
Brokering
• IFAD: Strong brokering between partners to initiate PPPP, as well as loan funding, technical 
support, monitoring and evaluation, support on public relations
• NGO: Support services for FOs
PPPP 
arrangements
New institutional arrangement created New roles that need to be sustained
System of CDCs and VCCs • Extension workers and key farmers 
undertake training and provide technology 
and services to farmers
• FOs manage VCCs
• District Management Units (government) 
manage CDCs
Case study continues 
over page 
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districts meant important delays in training 
and VCC development. While 150 farmers and 
extension agents have attended the training, they 
do not have enough knowledge to independently 
apply the technology and improvise in the field, 
so remain dependent on ongoing support from 
Mars. With limited resources for the PPPP, Mars 
has prioritised those (more central) areas where 
it sources cocoa, neglecting more remote and 
marginalised districts. 
Key learning 
• Clear objectives. The PPPP had a 
very clear objective of increasing the 
productivity and quality of cocoa produced 
by smallholder farmers. This clarity allowed 
IFAD to play a key role in identifying a 
private sector partner with a shared 
interest and strong technical competency. 
However, assumptions around how much 
training would be sufficient led to unfulfilled 
expectations among the partners.
• Develop incentives for the stakeholders to 
continue in their new roles. The long-term 
sustainability of the CDCs and VCCs in 
Indonesia depends on the willingness and 
ability of stakeholders to carry on new 
functions. However extension agents in 
particular lack incentives to specialise in 
cocoa, undermining long-term sustainability.
(1) Number of CDC, VCC and FOs shown as an illustrative example. There are 7 CDCs and 100 VCCs operated by 200 farmer groups.
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Figure 4.2: PPPP arrangement for cocoa technology support in Indonesia
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The application of Mars 
technology packages to 
rehabilitate cocoa gardens 
by farmers in the villages 
involved in the PPPP has been 
demonstrating results. During 
focus group discussions, farmers 
spontaneously described the 
demonstration plot as ‘a dream 
garden’, with cocoa plants rich 
in blossoms and fruits. With the 
right treatment, drainage, and 
input composition, soil quality 
has quickly improved.
Report from focus group discussion
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Rwanda17 
The case study in Rwanda involves PPPPs in 
two tea estates in the southern province of the 
country, one in Nshili and one in Mushubi. 
These PPPPs were designed and implemented 
as part of the government’s privatisation of 
the tea sector, and emerged from a previous 
IFAD-supported, Government of Rwanda 
project, the Smallholder Cash and Export Crops 
Development Project (PDCRE). The aim of 
the PPPPs was to secure substantial public and 
private sector investment to drive an increase 
in smallholder incomes and generate new 
employment opportunities in tea-growing 
regions in marginalised areas of the country. 
PPPP agreements
The model used for the PPPPs at Nshili and 
Mushubi was broadly similar. The private sector 
(in both cases a consortium) leased land from the 
government to manage a tea plantation and build 
and operate a tea factory, contributing financing, 
working capital and technical and managerial 
skills. The government provided infrastructure 
improvements (roads and electricity) to support 
the factory. The government and the private 
sector have formal agreements, including lease 
agreements on tea plantations and forests.
Cooperatives were set up by the government 
with the aim of providing a regular supply 
of quality green leaves to the factory. The 
cooperatives took loans from the Banque 
Rwandaise de Développement (BRD) to finance 
tea expansion and purchases of fertiliser and 
other inputs. 
New institutional arrangements created 
The PPPP develops the tea value chain,18 from 
inputs through production, processing and 
marketing, providing farmers with a guaranteed 
market. The PPPP emphasised developing 
cooperatives as viable, community-owned 
businesses (rather than pursuing tea production 
targets at any cost). The cooperatives are 
dependent on a single buyer for their crops, 
though a government-set pricing mechanism19 
helps protect farmers from extreme falls in 
tea prices and from an inequitable bargaining 
position with the companies.
The private investor owns 70 to 85 per cent of 
shares in the tea factories,20 with the government 
purchasing 15 per cent on behalf of the 
cooperative, to create greater ownership of the 
farmers in the PPPP and an opportunity for the 
farmers to benefit from dividends. 
Results
Tea growers have increased their incomes through 
selling green leaves and working in the factories as 
wage labourers, pluckers, cleaners etc. Households 
have been able to use some of their extra income 
 Tea pickers 
working in the 
field in Rwanda.
© IFAD/SUSAN BECCIO
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to invest in animals and other assets21 and 
access health services.22 Food security23 has also 
improved. The cooperatives and their members 
have assets including considerable land planted 
with tea,24 as well as shares in the tea factory. 
The PPPPs have also brought improvements in 
roads and electricity supply in both areas, as 
a result of government investment, as well as 
broader economic impacts. They have generated 
large numbers of permanent and seasonal jobs, 
as well as temporary work in transportation 
and construction, in areas where livelihood 
options were previously fairly limited. Before 
the PPPPs, up to 40 per cent of the labour force 
in both areas used to migrate to find seasonal 
work. Today, there is no seasonal out-migration; 
rural poor from other areas come to Nshili and 
Mushubi to find work.
However, although yields of green leaf have 
increased – from 0.1T/ha/year in 2011 to 
0.7T/ha/year in 2013 in Nshili and 2.5T/ha/year 
in 2013 in Mushubi, these are still below 
expectations of 6 to 7T/ha/year. Farmers are 
not seeing sufficient economic advantages in 
acceptable timeframes, and so are not fully 
implementing better crop management 
techniques (weeding, proper use of fertiliser, 
pruning). This is compounded by high 
vacancy rates, and, among other factors,25 
is contributing to lower than expected 
productivity. Low productivity is undermining 
smallholders’ ability to meet loan 
repayments.26 
Due to insufficient supplies of green leaf tea, 
both factories currently operate well below 
nominal capacity – 30 per cent in Mushubi 
(where nominal capacity is 3,500MT/year of 
made tea) and 40 per cent in Nshili (where 
nominal capacity is 3,000MT/year of made 
tea). This has generated tensions between the 
investor and the cooperatives. At both sites, the 
investor considers that the cooperatives are not 
Table 4.4: Rwanda PPPP overview
PPPP objective Investment in the tea sector in poor areas of the country
Smallholder 
inclusion
Smallholder constraints addressed What solution did the PPPP create?
Access to markets, farmer organisation • Local tea factory as market for green leaves 
(Nshili)
• New tea sector/factory (Mushubi)
Partners
Private sector Public sector Farmers
Private Investor consortia 
(Nshili Kivu Tea Plantation 
Company in Nshili 
and Multisectorielle 
d’Investissement de 
Gikongoro in Mushubi)
National Agriculture Export 
Board (NAEB) through PDCRE
Tea cooperatives formed by the 
government 
Roles
Invest in tea processing 
and provide technical 
assistance and logistics 
(transport, fertiliser)
• Formation and training of 
tea cooperatives, securing 
them a 15 per cent 
shareholding in tea factory
• Provide land and 
infrastructure
• Cooperatives represent farmers 
at factory board meeting and at 
the national level
• Farmers invest in tea and 
provide green leaves to the 
factory
Brokering IFAD: Loan funding, feasibility study during PPPP design, monitoring and evaluation
PPPP 
arrangements
New institutional arrangement created New roles that need to be sustained
Tea value chain linkages (processing factory, 
farmer production)
• Farmers to produce green leaves of good 
quality and quantity
• Companies process green leaves and 
market tea, and provide technical assistance 
and logistics
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doing enough to further increase productivity. 
On the other hand, a lack of transparency 
and involvement in factory operations creates 
mistrust for the cooperatives. In addition, 
in Mushubi, the investor is calling for a new 
shareholding structure due to cost overruns in 
factory development, which would diminish the 
cooperative holding to just 3.5 per cent, creating 
additional tensions.27
Key learning 
• Promoting shared interests. Both PPPPs 
were designed to incentivise partners to work 
together to achieve shared success, by 
ensuring that the factory needed to secure 
supplies from the cooperative bloc and the 
farmers to be profitable. However, unless 
the cooperatives can significantly increase 
productivity at each site, their viability is at stake.
• Involving smallholder producers. Despite 
the efforts to build farmer ownership of 
the PPPP by providing them with equity 
shares in the processing factories, the 
poor maintenance of plots and low farmer 
involvement suggests that the PPPP 
arrangements do not sufficiently take into 
account farmer needs and capacities. 
Challenges around production constraints or 
alternative income sources in the early years 
could have been addressed through stronger 
involvement of farmers in PPPP planning.
(1) Details used following Nshili’s structure, for illustration purposes only. Mushubi details vary, with individual smallholders owning 937 ha. and the industrial 
bloc 460 ha. However, the structure in Mushubi remains broadly the same.
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A woman farmer in Mushubi who acquired 
a 1.5ha tea plot through the PPPP has seen 
her income rise to eight times higher than the 
RWF3,000 a month (c. US$51 a year) she 
earned before the PPPP. She has bought a cow 
so that the family can have milk, and can now 
afford to pay her children’s school fees. She is 
also a member of her local Savings and Credit 
Co-operative (SACCO).
Focus group discussion
Taken together, the changes in Mushubi 
have proved ‘transformational’, not just for 
the households involved but others who have 
experienced the knock-on effects of local 
development.
Key informant interview
CASE STUDY RWANDA 23
Uganda28
The PPPP in Uganda is a component of the 
IFAD-funded Vegetable Oil Development Project 
(VODP). The PPPP aimed to establish oil palm 
production (a new cash crop in Uganda) through 
private sector-led agro-industrial development in 
Kalangala District on Bugala Island in Lake Victoria. 
Specific aims were to achieve import substitution 
of edible oil, raise smallholder incomes, improve 
population health through increased uptake of 
vegetable oil, and diversify exports.
PPPP agreements
The PPPP is based on an agreement between Bidco 
and the government of Uganda on the one hand, 
and a tripartite agreement between the government, 
Oil Palm Uganda Limited (OPUL, which runs 
the mill in Kalangala), and smallholder farmers 
represented by the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers 
Trust (KOPGT) on the other. Bidco’s operations 
in Uganda are run by Bidco Uganda Ltd (BUL),29 
which owns 90 per cent of shares in OPUL. KOPGT 
owns the remaining 10 per cent of shares. 
A crude oil palm mill and 10,000ha of plantations 
(6,500ha owned by the private sector and 3,500ha 
by smallholders) have been developed in Kalangala, 
along with a crude oil refinery in Jinja (near 
Kampala). This model represents a significant 
renegotiation of the original PPPP plans, which led 
to an increase in the size of the nucleus estate from 
1,000ha to 6,500ha. 
The farmers are dependent on OPUL to buy 
their crops; however a pre-set pricing formula, 
plus a pricing committee and services cost 
panel are intended to protect farmers by 
providing transparency and avoiding inequitable 
negotiations between farmers and the company. 
New institutional arrangements created 
The PPPP is an integrated oil palm value chain, 
with forward and backward linkages from inputs 
through production, processing and marketing, 
providing farmers with financing (government 
loan scheme) and a guaranteed market, with loan 
repayments linked to crop yields. 
KOPGT is the key structure for communication, 
decision-making, negotiation and dispute 
resolution between the farmers and the company. 
It is the commercial interface between farmers 
and the oil palm mill, through which agricultural 
inputs, extension services and payments for 
produce are provided. It also administers the 
substantial oil palm development loan scheme 
on behalf of the government. KOPGT’s board 
includes three farmers (of which one is the 
chair), three government representatives and one 
representative from civil society.
Results
Participating smallholders (including women) 
have benefited from formal legal recognition of 
their land tenure and have moved from subsistence 
farming to market-oriented production for income, 
acquiring new technologies in crop production 
and management. Improved incomes and income 
stability have enabled households to meet basic 
health and education needs, and invest in assets 
(livestock, vehicles, bicycles and farm assets). 
For women, who make up 35 per cent of the 
 Close-up 
of oil palm 
fruit bunches 
on Bugala 
island, 
Uganda.
© IFAD/SUSAN 
BECCIO
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beneficiaries,30 oil palm farming has given them 
access to a cash crop as well as access to credit. 
Short-term increases in food security have been the 
result of intercropping food and oil palm together 
(recommended by the PPPP for the first two years). 
Both the government and OPUL have made 
significant investments in public infrastructure 
including 400km of farm roads for transporting 
produce and 250km of link roads. Water transport 
services have also been substantially improved, 
with a modern ferry service to Kalangala. The PPPP 
has created job opportunities in the mill and on 
the nucleus estate.31 However many of these jobs 
have been taken by migrants from other parts of 
the country, putting pressure on existing state-run 
services.
Despite the many positive changes, there appear 
to have been important unintended consequences, 
including increases in domestic violence resulting 
from changes in incomes and land tenure rights; 
and a significant rise in the price of land on the 
island32 which, though beneficial in some respects, 
is fuelling land conflicts, particularly as absentee 
landowners have begun returning to the area.33 
Some farmers predict food security problems in 
the longer term, as not all of those taking part 
acted on the recommendation to keep some land 
for food production and mature trees leave little 
space for intercropping. Farmers with mature oil 
palm trees confirmed that this was indeed an issue. 
Farmers also complained of a lack of trust in some 
processes, e.g. quality assessments for oil palm 
fruit bunches, and a mistrust in the monopsony 
position of OPUL, despite mechanisms such as the 
pre-set pricing formula.
More generally, the PPPP experienced major delays 
to implementation and additional costs due to 
public opposition to the development, particularly 
in the early years; challenges in the government 
acquiring sufficient land; and limited engagement 
by smallholders. While KOPGT has played a 
central role in implementing the PPPP, it faces 
Table 4.5: Uganda PPPP overview
PPPP objective Development of domestic supply of edible vegetable oils 
Smallholder 
inclusion
Smallholder constraints addressed What solution did the PPPP create?
Access to finance, technology and markets, 
farmer organisation
New oil palm value chain inclusive of 
smallholders
Partners
Private sector Public sector Farmers
Bidco Uganda Ltd (BUL – a 
consortium of international 
companies) and OPUL 
(owned by BUL and KOPGT)
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) 
through VODP
Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust, 
with 10 per cent shareholding in 
OPUL
Farmers have developed their 
own association (KOPGA). Formal 
relationship to KOPGT is unclear
Roles
Invest in mill and factory, 
provide technical know-how, 
source inputs for sale to 
farmers (fertiliser, seedings)
• Creation of farmers’ trust 
(KOPGT), with 10 per cent 
shareholding in OPUL 
• Provide farmers’ loans, make 
land available to company 
and formalise land tenure of 
farmers, provide incentives (tax 
concessions) and infrastructure
• Farmers invest in oil palm and 
provide fresh fruit bunches to 
OPUL
Brokering
• IFAD: Loan funding, technical expertise on partnership agreement and business model, monitoring 
and evaluation, support on public relations, support for creation and operation of KOPGT.
• KOPGT: Interface between farmers and the oil palm mill
PPPP 
arrangements
New institutional arrangement created New roles that need to be sustained
Palm oil value chain • Farmers produce fresh fruit bunches (ffbs) 
based on prescribed process (use of fertiliser, 
harvesting technique)
• Mill purchases ffbs
• KOPGT provides services to farmers (credit, inputs, 
technology), sourced from OPUL in some cases
Case study 
continues 
over page 
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challenges to develop a long-term, financially 
viable business model. Most importantly, 
the lines of accountability between it and the 
smallholder farmers it is meant to represent 
are unclear. Farmers have instead set up their 
own organisation to represent their interests, 
the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association 
(KOPGA), illustrating the lack of ownership and 
voice they felt within KOPGT.
Key learning 
• Flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances. It is inevitable that in 
complex and large-scale developments 
involving numerous partners with different 
motivations and interests, unanticipated 
challenges will arise. Good monitoring 
fostered by IFAD and KOPGT have 
enabled the PPPP to continue to move 
forward, with good communication and 
negotiation towards joint solutions or 
adaptations.
• Farmers’ sense of ownership. While 
KOPGT has played a central role in 
implementing the PPPP, the lines of 
accountability between it and participating 
smallholder farmers are unclear. The fact 
that farmers set up KOPGA to represent 
their interests a year after KOPGT’s inception 
illustrates the lack of ownership they felt 
within the Trust.
P
ub
lic S
ecto
r
P
rivate S
ecto
r
IFAD
Domestic 
market
(edible oil & 
other products)
Government of 
UgandaVODP
KOPGA
(farmers’ 
organisation) MoUTripartite 
agreement
90% 
sharesF
re
sh
 fr
ui
t 
b
un
ch
es
Fresh fruit bunches
OPUL
(processing plant)
KOPGT
Oil palm
small 
producers
Private Sector
(BIDCO and 
others)
10%
 
shares
M
em
b
er
s
Representation
Re
pr
es
en
tat
ion
Figure 4.4: PPPP arrangement in oil palm value chain in Uganda
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…oil palm trees have contributed to 
increasing our food crop production because 
in the gardens of young trees, where plants 
are still short, a household is allowed to 
intercrop with beans, maize, sweet potatoes…
Women who grow oil palm make good 
decisions in homes…what to buy, what we 
eat and what others eat…
…because there was a monetary value 
attached to the size of land a farmer cleared 
for planting oil palm, most farmers cleared 
all the land…leaving no land for planting 
food crops. So in the long term… there will 
be severe food shortages…
Focus group discussions / key informant interviews
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This section summarises the main development 
outcomes described in the four case studies, and how 
these are linked to the design and implementation of 
the PPPPs. It is the basis for the enabling factors for 
agricultural value chain PPPPs set out in Section 5.
1. Improved yields and quality, but below 
potential in some cases
The PPPPs all sought to raise farmers’ yields and 
the quality of crops through improved technology 
and/or access to inputs and services, as a means 
of improving livelihoods. In this they were 
no different to a great number of agricultural 
development projects, although they specifically 
relied on private sector partners as the providers of 
improved technology. In these primary objectives, 
the PPPPs have all been successful,34 although 
yields in Rwanda and Indonesia have not reached 
potential or optimal levels. In part this is likely to 
be a factor of time, as improvements take hold. 
In some cases, notably Rwanda and Uganda,35 
poor crop management and low fertiliser use by 
farmers is a problem. This flags the first learning: 
successful agricultural PPPPs require farmers to 
see economic advantages. If farmers do not buy 
into the PPPP, they are unlikely to perform their 
roles as expected, with knock-on effects, such 
as poor credit recovery, or processing plants 
operating far below capacity that can affect the 
sustainability of the whole endeavour. 
2. Improved income stability
Income stability has particularly improved in 
Uganda where market access has been secured and 
harvesting takes place monthly. Improved income 
stability has meant improved access to basic health 
and education in Uganda, and investment in assets 
(livestock, vehicles, farm assets). Fourteen out 
of 47 farmers interviewed as part of the research 
reported acquiring assets directly from the PPPP 
and 25 indirectly. Incomes vary but are linked 
to market prices for oil palm (avoiding price 
negotiations between farmers and OPUL) and loan 
repayments are linked to yields, smoothing out 
volatility.  In Ghana, where both prices and markets 
vary considerably from season to season, income 
improvements have not been stable however.
Secure market access, with mechanisms to 
manage pricing, costs and risks, and which take 
into account the relatively weak bargaining 
position of farmers, support income stability. 
3. High exposure to risk related to credit 
schemes
As a result of the PPPPs, farmers have benefited 
from increased access to finance but have also 
faced higher risk. Late repayments are already 
causing problems in Ghana – for both farmers 
and rural banks. In Rwanda and Uganda, loans 
are over longer periods of time36 but in Rwanda 
the ability of farmers to repay loans is already 
looking problematic. Tea production is a long-term 
investment with risks involved. Bushes take three 
to four years to start producing, only reaching peak 
yield after seven to eight years. Farmers bear the 
risk of upfront investment, with the expectation 
of return on this investment later. Based on group 
discussions and key informants’ interviews, 
cooperatives have contracted unsustainable loans 
using their equity share and land titles as collateral 
(though measures are now being taken to try to 
Baseline Yield achieved after 
project intervention
Expected or potential yield 
Ghana 0.8MT/ha/yr (2008) on 
average
1.5 to 3.2MT/ha/yr 1.8MT/ha (national average)
Indonesia 50kg/tree/month (2010) Up to  
200kg/tree/month
400–500kg per tree per 
month (achieved during 
2005–06)
Rwanda 0.1T/ha/year (2011) in Nshili
No tea grown previously in 
Mushubi
0.7T/ha/year in 2013 in Nshili
2.5T/ha/year in 2013 in 
Mushubi
6–7T/ha/year (projections 
used for loan calculation)
Uganda No oil palm grown previously Up to 15T/ha/yr for trees in 
sixth year in 2013, but falling 
again by 5 per cent in 2014
Yields of 15T/ha/yr expected 
only in ninth year
Table 4.6: Crop yields in the four countries before and after interventions
Development outcomes
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Development outcomes
address this challenge). In Uganda, linking 
repayments to yields has mitigated potential 
risks, although low soil fertility is still a threat 
in some cases. Arrangements established by 
PPPPs often expose farmers to greater risks. 
PPPP design should identify these risks, 
and consider how they will be mitigated or 
allocated between partners. 
4. Positive benefits for non-participants 
from employment opportunities and 
infrastructure
In Uganda and Rwanda, the PPPPs have contributed 
to wider economic transformation, including job 
creation in plantations and processing facilities, 
improved infrastructure (transport, electricity) and 
general business activity, although it was beyond 
the scope of the research to look at the detailed 
impacts of these changes. In Uganda, more than 
80 per cent of farms reported to be linked to the 
road network. Also, the new ferry has increased 
access to Bugala Island in general. In Rwanda, 
upgraded roads have facilitated the transport 
of tea to Mombasa auction and promoted the 
development of business centres in the areas 
neighbouring the factory. The management team 
in Mushubi confirmed the importance of the 
upgrading of roads and provision of electricity. 
Even in Ghana where the PPPP was much more 
targeted, wider effects have included casual 
employment in tasks such as land stomping, 
weeding, processing and ploughing; improved 
cash flow for tractor service providers; and some 
reports of local spot market traders who have 
begun differentiating maize based on quality.37 
Women have benefited from the PPPPs where 
they were specifically targeted, such as in 
Rwanda and Uganda. In Nshili, in Rwanda, 
initial provisions targeted 4,800 households of 
which 30 per cent would be headed by women. 
Although the number reached is lower – 2,560 
households – 37 per cent of these are women. 
In Indonesia, women’s participation in farming 
activities has increased; however, what benefits 
they derive is unclear.
5. Unintended consequences related to 
migration, land use, gender dynamics
The larger the PPPP, in terms of scale of investment 
and activities, the more likely it is to be accompanied 
by wider and often unintended consequences. 
These were seen in relation to land prices and 
pressures, particularly in Uganda where absentee 
landowners have started to return; in relation to 
migration of labour to the PPPP areas; and in 
relation to changes to gender dynamics within 
the farm, household or community. 
These unintended consequences are not 
necessarily negative, but they involve winners 
as well as losers. There should be effective 
mechanisms to identify social, economic and 
environmental impacts, both positive and 
negative, especially those affecting marginalised 
community members such as women and the 
landless or near landless. Otherwise, they risk 
being excluded or included on unfavourable 
terms. Finally, it is not possible to predict all 
the potential consequences in advance, so close 
monitoring and adaptation is required as 
implementation proceeds, along with public 
accountability mechanisms. 
6. Long-term sustainability is uncertain
All the PPPPs are facing challenges with 
long-term sustainability. They have developed 
new arrangements that organise farmers and 
enhance access to inputs, credit, technology 
and/or the market. However, the long-term 
operations of these arrangements are not secure. 
This affects, for example, the cashless credit 
scheme in Ghana, due to high production 
risk and loan delinquencies; the VCCs in 
Indonesia, due to insufficient technical capacity 
to support them; and the long-term business 
model of KOPGT in Uganda. PPPPs need 
to create ongoing incentives, capabilities 
and financing for partners to continue to 
perform new or improved roles once initial 
support and brokering is removed.
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 The improved 
daily ferry from 
Entebbe to 
Bugala island, 
Uganda.
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 A farmer shows 
the new fruits on 
his cocoa trees 
after learning 
new techniques 
at a CDC, 
Central Sulawesi, 
Indonesia.
© IFAD/ROGER ARNOLD
This section sets out eight elements of design 
and implementation of PPPPs that were 
identified as contributing to the development 
outcomes observed in the four case studies. It 
presents this learning in the form of ‘enabling 
factors’ for agricultural value chain PPPPs 
to improve the livelihoods of farmers and 
contribute to broader rural development.
5.1 Define the rationale and underlying 
assumptions 
There are many ways in which governments can 
spend limited resources. The public sector needs 
to be specific about the constraints it is seeking 
to address through the PPPP and the rationale 
5 Enabling factors for 
 agricultural value chain PPPPs 
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for partnering with the private sector, including 
the feasibility of the approach being proposed. 
A general sense of complementarity and 
win-win opportunities provides an insufficient 
rationale to invest in a PPPP. Table 5.1 outlines 
the PPPP rationale for the four case studies.
The PPPPs all show a relatively clear rationale, 
responding to the key questions:
• What is the constraint to be overcome? 
Constraints included access to technology, 
finance and markets, and lack of farmer 
organisation.
• How will working with the private sector 
overcome this constraint? The two areas 
where the private sector was seen to bring 
particular competencies in the PPPPs are 
in improved agricultural technology and 
creating linkages to markets. 
Feasibility of plans and assumptions
Understanding the constraints and potential 
PPPP solutions is not enough, however. 
Assumptions behind the solutions also 
need to be identified and feasibility tested. 
In the case studies, unrealistic forecasts of 
what could be achieved in terms of farmer 
mobilisation, productivity gains or inculcating 
farmers’ organisations with a business 
approach, misunderstandings between the 
partners, or unfounded assumptions about 
the roles of actors that are not PPPP partners, 
created challenges or risks during PPPP 
implementation.
In Indonesia, the PPPP design assumed that 
the Mars training package from South Sulawesi 
could be adapted for the PPPP, with training 
time reduced to maximise the numbers being 
trained within the available budget.40 Key 
farmers and extension agents so trained were 
expected to have the threshold expertise needed 
to support the Village Cocoa Centres and to 
revitalise cocoa production. In reality, although 
150 farmers and extension agents had been 
trained at the time of the fieldwork, they lacked 
sufficient knowledge to independently apply 
the technology and improvise in the field, and 
were dependent on ongoing support from Mars. 
In addition, Mars had expected the training to 
improve the capacity of local extension agents, 
and so reduce their role over time. However the 
extension agents lacked incentives to specialise 
in cocoa. 
Experience from partnerships in other 
sectors suggests that underestimating costs 
and overestimating benefits – often quite 
significantly – is a common design flaw 
(Sadka 2006). PPPPs need to be explicit about 
assumptions being made and why these 
assumptions are justified, as part of the theory 
of change – considering whether all actors have 
incentives to play the roles expected of them. 
PPPP design should also be backed up by expert 
technical or feasibility studies in crucial areas 
like productivity. 
Defining the PPPP rationale: The role 
of brokers
Brokers can ask the right questions early on, 
defining clearly the purpose and value of the 
PPPP (versus other options), and identifying 
and justifying assumptions. This process should 
be underpinned by effective feasibility studies 
and scrutiny of assumptions behind PPPP 
design, supported by strong technical expertise 
as required.
Ghana Indonesia Rwanda Uganda
Smallholder 
constraints
Access to finance 
and technology,39 
farmer organisation
Access to 
technology, farmer 
organisation
Access to markets, 
farmer organisation
Access to finance, 
technology and 
markets, farmer 
organisation
Role of private 
sector partners
Technology 
provision (Nestle) 
and marketing 
channel (SFMC) to 
enable access to 
finance
Technology 
provision (Mars)
Marketing channel 
through factory 
investment (NKTP 
in Nshili and MIG 
in Mushubi), some 
technical assistance
Technology 
provision and 
marketing channel 
through mill 
investment (OPUL/
Bidco)
Table 5.1: PPPP rationale38
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5.2 Ensure a clear market pull 
Within development, there is recognition that 
organising and providing training to small-scale 
producers and improving their access to services 
and inputs, without a clear market demand, 
does not ensure sustainable livelihoods (Bitzer 
et al. 2009). Value chain PPPPs offer the 
opportunity to overcome this gap by connecting 
smallholder farmers directly with markets. In 
most of the cases studied, the PPPPs support 
value chain linkages between smallholders and 
companies.41 
In Ghana, value chain relationships from 
farmers to consumers were brokered at 
two levels. ACDEP brokered maize supply 
agreements between farmers’ organisations 
and the aggregator, SFMC; government staff 
brokered a purchase arrangement between 
SFMC and the end user, Akate Farms. Building 
linkages to end users like Akate Farms has been 
a relatively recent step for the programme, and 
has responded to past marketing challenges 
at the level of the aggregator. As smallholder 
farmers have begun to demonstrate that they 
can reliably produce quality outputs, other 
companies (e.g. Premium Foods and Yedent) 
now have agents in northern regions looking to 
source quality grain.
Agricultural value chain PPPPs tend to be 
developed based on one of two models – either 
vertical coordination by the lead firm or more 
collaborative, relationship-based models 
(Gereffi et al. 2005; Abdulsamad et al. 2015). In 
vertically coordinated models, companies exert 
significant control on supply, with unidirectional 
information flows regarding standards and 
grades for the crop. However, given the high 
degree of power asymmetry between buyer and 
farmers, this is not necessarily accompanied 
by an increase in farmers’ participation or 
a redistribution of rewards. The ability to 
renegotiate or withdraw from a contract can 
be quite limited (Vorley et al. 2012). Relational 
models put more emphasis on trust-building, 
though often at the expense of efficient 
coordination and value chain management, 
thereby limiting access to very competitive 
markets. There are fewer power and information 
asymmetries and more collaborative exchange, 
risk-sharing and cooperation (Guidi 2011).
The PPPPs in Rwanda and Uganda follow the 
first model with a single lead firm (or consortia) 
coordinating the value chain, setting standards 
and driving efficiency. These value chains offer 
farmers secure markets and have also created 
broader community benefits, particularly linked 
to PPPP investments in infrastructure (by the 
public sector) and processing facilities (by the 
private sector). In Rwanda, for example, the 
PPPP has been accompanied by significant job 
creation, the development of small businesses 
and business centres and a reversal of seasonal 
labour migration out of the area.42 However, in 
both countries, farmers are highly dependent 
on the company, and on high levels of upfront 
investment and debt. 
In contrast, the PPPP in Ghana involves 
multiple private sector actors, some as a formal 
part of the PPPP (Nestle and SFMC), but others 
linked in through structures such as the cashless 
credit system (rural banks and input and service 
providers). The PPPP allows flexibility for 
farmers to change crop composition within the 
system. Several of the farmers reported plans 
to increase investment in soy, for example, 
which they saw as more profitable than 
maize. However, despite the presence of some 
purchasing arrangements between farmers and 
the aggregator, markets are less secure than in 
Rwanda and Uganda. Both parties (farmers 
and aggregator) have at times reneged on their 
obligations, where there has been a divergence 
between the prevailing open market price and 
the agreed price. 
 Men bringing 
bundles of 
tea from the 
field to the tea 
factory in Nshili, 
Rwanda.
© IFAD/SUSAN BECCIO
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The best model is likely to depend on the 
circumstances of the value chain, the actors 
involved and the point in time when the 
PPPP is being developed. Outcomes will also 
depend on how the value chain operates, 
whether risks are adequately shared (see next 
section) and the mechanisms that address 
the inherently unequal power relations that 
exist in vertically coordinated chains. Certain 
features of the PPPP in Uganda help protect 
farmers, in both crop pricing and input costs 
(Box 5.1). These include a price that is linked 
to the world market price, removing the need 
for price negotiation between the farmers and 
the company. There are also committees that 
oversee pricing and services costs, and bring 
transparency to the process. Given the lack 
of competition in Kalangala in the markets 
for both inputs and oil palm fresh fruit 
bunches (ffbs), transparent and independent 
mechanisms are crucial. 
Pricing mechanisms in Uganda
Pricing formula
Pricing follows a pre-set formula, based on 
world market prices, the oil extraction rate, 
which is determined by the quality of harvested 
ffbs, and the costs involved in palm oil 
processing.43
The fresh fruit bunch pricing 
committee
Farmers are represented by KOPGT on the 
ffb pricing committee. This is convened every 
month and is expected to review prices for 
farmers’ fruits sold to OPUL, based on the 
agreed formula. The pricing formula and other 
details are enshrined in the tripartite agreement 
between the company, the farmers and the 
government. Other members of the committee 
include government ministries, the Kalangala 
District Local Government and OPUL.
Services cost panel
The services cost panel reviews the prices 
charged for OPUL-supplied inputs and 
services covered by PPPP loans, and verifies 
value for money. Decisions are reached after 
the suppliers of goods and services have 
quoted rates chargeable, and verifications of 
specifications and prices have been carried 
out by technical teams called valuation 
committees. Members include representatives 
from KOPGA, KOPGT, OPUL and one 
government official.
5.3 Prioritise farmer ownership of the PPPP 
Ownership and involvement of all partners 
based on jointly agreed objectives, with clear 
roles and responsibilities, are frequently 
identified as critical for successful partnerships. 
The PPPPs in the case studies required 
commitments and activities not only from 
public and private sectors but also from farmers. 
Operationalising the concept of PPPPs is not 
easy, however. Where farmers are not part 
of negotiation and design, the partnership 
is unlikely to fully reflect their priorities and 
interests. The poor maintenance of plots in 
Rwanda or side-selling of fertiliser in Uganda 
and maize in Ghana can be seen as indicative 
of weak farmer commitment and ownership 
(alongside short-term economic pressures). 
These problems arise despite laudable efforts in 
both Rwanda and Uganda to build ownership 
by providing farmers with equity shares in the 
processing factories. 
To take the case of Uganda, the challenge is 
with farmers’ ownership of KOPGT, which 
represents them in the PPPP. Although farmers 
have spokespersons on the Board, KOPGT is 
not fully answerable to them. In response, 
farmers have set up their own representative 
body, the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers 
Association (KOPGA), to represent their 
interests, although the relationship, roles and 
governance structure between KOPGT and 
KOPGA are not well defined. 
 
Other research on agricultural PPPPs and 
value chains more generally finds the same 
challenge of top-down processes that prioritise 
preparing farmers to participate in the value 
chain but fail to meet their priorities and 
aspirations. However well intentioned, this can 
lead to farmers being used for purposes not 
determined by them, and to poorly functioning 
partnerships as a result (Fairtrade Foundation 2014; 
Bitzer et al. 2009; Bitzer and Glasbergen 2013; 
Willoughby 2014). 
Experience from inclusive business initiatives 
(Vorley and Thorpe 2014) suggests that 
arrangements in which large companies work 
directly with the poorest and most marginalised 
farmers often fail to effectively include them. 
The alternative is to build links with and 
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support for existing smallholder production 
(rather than organising smallholders for the 
purpose of joining new value chains). This 
could mean connecting companies to an 
aggregator (as in Ghana) or to processors that 
can aggregate smallholder production, or to an 
already motivated and established producer 
organisation. The risk of this approach is that 
it includes only better-off smallholders. 
However, government partners in PPPPs can 
support the inclusion of more smallholders 
in existing production networks, such as by 
providing infrastructure or making training 
accessible to women. 
Experience from one initiative in Indonesia44 
that has created new producer organisations in 
the context of a donor-funded inclusive value 
chain finds that such organisations are most 
successfully built from the bottom up, with 
responsibilities kept at the lowest level of farmer 
organisation possible, and farmers given a role 
in designing structures and direct control over 
activities. This approach succeeded in increasing 
farmers’ commitment and sense of ownership 
from the outset,45 especially when contrasted 
with other similar projects in Indonesia that had 
focused on technical production problems with 
farmers as passive actors. Initiatives where the 
farmers’ apex organisation was effectively 
supervised and controlled by a nucleus estate 
were especially problematic. However, 
the time taken to set up viable farmers’ 
organisations was considerable – 14 years from 
developing local farmers’ groups through to 
building the primary and then secondary 
cooperative. At the secondary cooperative level, 
where control by farmers is indirect, trust and a 
sense of ownership are still relatively weak 
(Jelsma et al. 2009). 
PPPP brokers can help build smallholder 
capacity in structures such as these, and help 
them organise and bargain effectively, through 
access to information and to professional 
advice and expertise. In Uganda, IFAD has 
helped farmers to access technical support 
(e.g. bringing in consultants or other technical 
experts). Brokers can also help build the 
capacity of weaker members of producer 
organisations, and improve governance such 
that leaders’ accountability towards their 
members is more effective. However, there is a 
fine line between supporting and undermining 
the autonomy of producer organisations. 
Support should be committed for the long 
term but with a clear phasing-out strategy 
(World Bank 2007).
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Developing PPPPs: The role of brokers
Brokers can build smallholder capacity to 
participate as partners in the PPPP, helping 
them to organise effectively, access information 
and negotiate a fair deal. Ideally this means 
involving farmers directly in the initial PPPP 
negotiation and design.
5.4Align incentives of partners and build trust 
An effective partnership means selecting the 
right partners, creating the right incentives for 
collaboration and building trust. Choosing 
the right private sector partner for a PPPP 
requires an understanding of the constraints 
to be overcome, and the competencies of 
different private sector partners. Competitive 
bidding and partner due diligence processes, or 
working with already established partners are 
all strategies to identify companies’ capabilities 
and motives.46 Competitive bidding, such as 
that used in Uganda, improves the bargaining 
position of the government and is likely to 
be important in complex PPPPs, especially 
where companies receive direct benefits or 
incentives from the government (e.g. tax 
breaks or subsidies) to ensure transparency 
and avoid corruption (actual or perceived). 
However, bidding processes are challenging, 
especially for inexperienced governments. When 
organisations with different backgrounds (such 
as governments and companies) do business in 
a context of weak institutions, a good reputation 
or history of good experience can be more 
important, especially where particular skills 
or qualities make one company an obvious 
candidate. 
In Indonesia, the government had serious 
doubts about working with profit-driven 
companies, but IFAD presented a PPPP as a 
potential opportunity to resolve the challenge 
of low cocoa productivity, and was in a position 
to build understanding between public and 
private sectors. IFAD identified Mars as a partner 
with the right skills and resources to offer, 
based on good experiences of collaborating 
with the company in Papua New Guinea. As 
the company’s benefits from the PPPP were 
indirect (i.e. a general improvement in cocoa 
productivity and quality), the risk of not having 
a competitive bidding process was relatively low. 
Once the private sector partner is selected, 
agreements are needed to create incentives 
for partners to perform their intended roles 
and responsibilities and to feel confident that 
the other partners will perform their roles. 
Incentives are most fully aligned when there is 
interdependence, commitment and ownership 
of shared PPPP objectives by all partners, each 
of whom has something to lose if objectives are 
not achieved. If each partner has ‘skin in the 
game’ in this way, there is reason to believe they 
will work to achieve shared objectives, even in 
the face of unexpected developments. 
Interdependence between companies and 
smallholder farmers tends to emerge when the 
achievement of company goals, such as security 
or quality of supply, depends on successful 
smallholder production. This may occur 
because the crop is only or largely produced 
by smallholders (e.g. cocoa), or because the 
volumes required for the company to break 
even include trade with smallholders. Where 
such an arrangement increases the risk to the 
company and its cost of capital, governments 
can counteract this effect by helping to lower 
risk, e.g. through a loan guarantee. However, 
governments should also remember that the 
risk to a company’s investment is an incentive 
for it to perform well, so should avoid providing 
excessive guarantees (UNECE 2008). 
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In Rwanda, the government’s agreement 
with the private investor stipulated that the 
size of the company plantation should not 
exceed 30 per cent of the total acreage. The 
aim was to ensure that the factory needed to 
secure supplies from the cooperative bloc and 
smallholders, creating interdependence. In 
Uganda, the company negotiated a substantial 
redesign of the original PPPP plans, increasing 
the size of the nucleus estate from 1,000ha 
to 6,500ha (versus 3,500ha smallholder 
production). While the company still has an 
interest in successful smallholder production, 
since the mill cannot run at capacity without 
it, this change has inevitably diminished the 
stake the company has in the success of the 
smallholders. 
Other experience in the oil palm sector suggests 
that the share of land for the nucleus estate in 
relation to smallholder schemes determines 
the interdependence of the actors (Jelsma 
et al. 2009). Where the company has a large 
production area, it is less dependent on 
smallholders for a significant share of its mill 
feedstock, and they are less likely to receive the 
attention and investment required. Smallholders 
may instead be seen as a side activity, fulfilling 
government or donor requirements or to 
facilitate access to low cost credit.
While formal, contractually established 
arrangements can be important in PPPPs with 
intense levels of collaboration (Bitzer et al. 
2009), they are not the only option. One study 
of farm agribusiness linkages in Africa found 
no evidence that formal contractual agreements 
drive sound linkages between smallholder 
farmers and buyers, and emphasised instead 
the development of mutual trust over the 
longer term requiring a perception of ‘fair 
play’ on both sides, underpinned by a sound 
understanding of quality requirements, quality 
control methods, payment terms and expected 
delivery schedules (Dannson et al. 2004). 
At issue is the substantial asymmetry in 
information and bargaining power between 
farmers and other partners. For example, buyers 
commonly make any price agreed conditional 
on farmers meeting quality requirements 
or standards that are specified in advance. 
However, these terms are not always clearly 
stated or farmers fail to understand them 
(Technoserve 2011). In Uganda, despite the 
transparent mechanism to set prices, farmers 
complain that they do not understand the 
formula, the quality assessments by OPUL 
and the monthly deductions to service loans. 
The lack of trust in turn leads actors (farmer, 
company or government) to view partners as 
‘others’, to whom they feel little obligation 
(Holmes 2012). 
Building trust between parties that are not 
used to working together or thinking of each 
other as partners – or who have a history 
of poor relationships – is unlikely to occur 
spontaneously. Rather, significant leadership 
is required. This may come from within the 
partnership organisations, but often brokers 
are particularly crucial (Guidi 2011). IFAD has 
been central to partnership development and 
promoting trust to grow between the partners 
in both Uganda and Indonesia, for example. 
IFAD’s role was to help partners understand 
the opportunities and risks of the PPPP and 
overcome negative perceptions, opening 
the door for collaboration. Brokers can also 
provide capacity support for farmers and 
ensure they have access to information and 
are helped to negotiate fair deals. For example, 
in Ghana, ACDEP supports farmers to review 
contracts, to understand the terms being set out 
and to maintain fairness. Establishing greater 
direct interaction between partners, including 
between companies and farmers, e.g. through 
training, at buying points or through text 
messages, can also build shared understanding 
and trust (Holmes 2012).
Interdependence: The role of brokers
Brokers can facilitate contact with potential 
partners, developing trust and building 
understanding between the non-traditional 
partners that make up PPPPs (government, 
local company, multinational and farmers), 
with often conflicting organisational cultures. 
Brokers can also help partners understand 
their potential benefits and identify common 
objectives. To play this role effectively, the 
broker itself needs the trust of the partners.
Technical support on partnership agreements 
and business models from actors that 
understand private sector interests can help 
governments identify the best possible deal, 
not only value for money but in terms of aligning 
incentives around shared PPPP objectives. 
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5.5 Manage risks through identification, 
distribution and mitigation
Risk is an inherent part of agriculture, and 
connecting farmers to more formal value 
chains can expose them to a system that is 
sensitive to shocks, particularly if growing a 
crop for export, or if dependent on imported 
inputs (Bolwig et al. 2008). Yet, few PPPP-
based projects have adequate risk management 
or mitigation strategies in place (Spielman et 
al. 2010). Unless risk is managed, the weakest 
value chain actors (normally the farmers) 
tend to bear a disproportionate share, and 
it can also raise costs and undermine the 
sustainability of the PPPP as a whole. For 
example, in Ghana, farmers are required to pay 
loans in full, even in years when crops fail or 
the aggregator fails to purchase their produce. 
This has implications not only for the farmers 
affected but also for the PPPP as a whole. One 
leading rural bank has decided not to offer 
agricultural loans for the 2014/15 cropping 
year as a result. 
PPPP design should firstly identify risks and 
how risks are distributed. Mechanisms are 
then needed to manage, mitigate or share risk, 
avoiding excessive unmitigated risk burden 
on one party. Risk mitigation measures 
include safety nets such as supply chain risk 
management (stabilisation or compensation) 
funds, micro-insurance schemes against bad 
weather and shared investments to improve 
the functioning of the value chain. Working 
through aggregators or other intermediaries 
who deal in multiple products can also help 
smallholders spread their risks by diversifying 
into other markets for different quality grades or 
rotational crops (Bright and Seville 2010). Good 
communication between partners and ongoing 
monitoring can also identify new risks that arise 
during implementation.
In Uganda, risks related to farmers’ ability 
to repay loans have been partly mitigated by 
linking loan repayments to yields, for example.47 
The loans are recovered through deductions 
from farmers’ payments once harvesting begins, 
with deductions in instalments of 33 per cent 
of each monthly harvest, over an eight to ten 
year period. This helps to reduce the risk of 
non-payment of loans or of unsustainable 
debt burden in years when the harvest is 
poor, though very low yields could still create 
problems.
Again, assumptions behind the design of 
PPPPs and specific mechanisms such as loan 
schemes also need to be identified and tested 
for feasibility, or risks can be exacerbated. 
In Rwanda, for example, projections around 
short-term productivity gains that now 
look unrealistic have raised doubts over the 
sustainability of loans to farmers.48 These 
projections were based in part on assumptions 
around farmers’ crop management and use of 
fertiliser that are not being met. The design also 
failed to take account of the high vacancy rate.49 
Measures are now being taken to try to address 
these issues, such as helping farmers in gap 
filling and maintenance programmes to increase 
yield, as well loan renegotiation. 
5.6Build the capacity to respond to changes in 
complex market systems 
PPPPs operate within market systems in which 
partners face bounded rationality. Agricultural 
markets consist of many individual but 
interdependent parts, with the dynamics of the 
system emerging from interactions between 
these parts. Individuals are both affected by and 
adapt to other actors’ decisions, and as a result, 
PPPP interventions may lead to unforeseen 
outcomes – challenges as well as opportunities. 
For example, in Ghana the cashless credit 
system and brokering by the government have 
been successful in engendering trust among 
rural banks and encouraging them to lend to 
smallholder farmers where previously they had 
been reluctant. The number of participating 
rural banks stood at 24 when the fieldwork took 
place, from a starting base of two.50 However, 
as the PPPP has expanded (and other similar 
programmes are implemented in northern 
Ghana), liquidity challenges have arisen for 
these banks, with lending restricted by the 
Ghanian government’s prudent financial 
requirements. This challenge was not foreseen. 
This unpredictability is not undesirable or 
indicative of failure. It is not possible to design 
a PPPP that anticipates all the ways in which 
changes might affect the market system. Instead, 
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PPPPs need mechanisms to identify these 
changes, and the flexibility to respond and adapt 
to the unexpected. This can include reinforcing 
positive results, dampening negative effects, 
overcoming challenges and resolving disputes 
that may arise. However, this does not imply 
that PPPPs should be infinitely flexible. PPPPs 
need to respond to the unexpected within the 
objectives of the partnership, and if a PPPP is not 
achieving its objectives and no way can be found 
for it to do so, then it should be terminated. 
Effective monitoring of the PPPP based on 
appropriate indicators that proactively identify 
outcomes that are being achieved is the first step. 
In the PPPP in Uganda, good monitoring has 
played an important role in identifying problems 
and helping partners to jointly develop solutions. 
IFAD has been central to this process, with 
six-monthly missions to review implementation, 
and develop detailed action plans and timetables 
to address gaps, and a process to discuss and 
endorse the findings with the PPPP partners. In 
contrast, in Ghana, monitoring and evaluation 
did not identity and resolve some of key 
challenges quickly enough, such as poor timing 
of input delivery to farmer-based organisations 
and problems with loan repayments.
Performance monitoring and indicators are 
needed which focus on what the PPPP is seeking 
to achieve. These are different in emphasis from 
impact evaluation, which focuses on attribution 
between interventions and specific outcomes. 
Although partners will ultimately have different 
information needs linked to their different 
interests and audiences (e.g. shareholders for 
companies and citizens for governments), 
there is value in developing a shared set of core 
performance indicators. These should reflect 
joint PPPP objectives.51 
Spaces for communication and negotiation 
between the partners are also needed to identify 
solutions and adapt to changing circumstances. 
Regular dialogue brings together partners to 
discuss PPPP performance and whether it is 
on track to meet objectives, and it supports 
development of joint solutions where needed. 
An accessible and independent broker can 
ensure these mechanisms give a voice to all 
partners, build capacity among farmers’ groups 
to participate, and facilitate dialogue around 
differences or conflicts that arise.
In Rwanda, there are regular meetings 
between farmers and the company on tea crop 
management. Factory managers, plantation 
managers and cooperatives meet monthly 
to discuss productivity, fertiliser, prices, 
transportation and supply of quality green leaves. 
Solutions are developed, the implementation of 
which is monitored and discussed in follow-up 
meetings. Regular meetings also take place 
between the government and the private investor 
consortia to assess the extent to which mutual 
responsibilities are being taken care of. In Uganda, 
IFAD undertakes ongoing monitoring to track 
performance, identify issues and lead a process for 
the partners to jointly develop solutions.
In the case study PPPPs, brokers including IFAD, 
the government or NGOs have tended to play 
the key role in dispute resolution. For example, 
in Ghana, conflicts have resulted from price 
disparity between what aggregators have agreed 
with smallholder farmers and prices offered 
by itinerant traders at the local markets, or due 
to government-announced minimum prices 
through the National Buffer Stock Company. 
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These conflicts are usually resolved through the 
District Value Chain Committees, supported by 
the NGO, ACDEP.
In the long term, once brokers have exited, 
independent mechanisms for dispute resolution 
are needed. Examples from other countries 
include the Sisal Board in Tanzania, which brokers 
disputes between companies and producers, and 
has specifically made space for smallholders’ 
and women‘s representatives. In the Philippines, 
the government has set up a process to approve 
agricultural investment agreements and to settle 
disputes to protect agrarian reform beneficiaries 
(representing the majority of smallholders) from 
unfair contract terms (Vorley et al. 2012).
Adapt to changes: The role of brokers
Brokers can support dialogue between the 
partners. An accessible and independent broker 
can ensure that mechanisms for dialogue give a 
voice to all partners and can facilitate dialogue 
around differences or conflicts that arise, 
supporting development of joint solutions.
They can support monitoring and evaluation 
of PPPP progress to ensure that the PPPP 
is on track to meet its objectives, identify the 
problems that will arise, and adapt to changing 
circumstances.
5.7 Take a proactive approach to public 
accountability and transparency
The impacts of PPPPs frequently extend beyond 
direct partners to a wider group of external 
stakeholders. These can include positive spillovers 
that benefit wider communities. However, they 
also include negative externalities related, for 
example, to environmental impacts, changes 
in land tenure arrangements or poor working 
conditions. The larger the scale of PPPP activities 
and its likely impacts, the more important it is to 
proactively identify and address these impacts, 
involving potentially affected stakeholders in the 
decision-making process. This is not a one-time 
activity at design, but an ongoing process as PPPP 
implementation proceeds.
While accountability processes have costs for 
PPPPs, as time is needed to consult stakeholders 
and respond to concerns raised, not doing so 
may have even greater costs. In Uganda, the 
PPPP has dealt with ongoing allegations related 
to negative environmental impacts, improper 
tax concessions and evictions.52 The PPPP has 
invested considerable time and effort to respond 
to concerns, abandoning proposals to release 
(‘degazette’) public forest land for oil palm 
production, setting up an Impact Monitoring 
System (IMS), undertaking an independent study 
of tax concessions,53 engaging with stakeholders 
and encouraging visits to the project. While 
this responsiveness is to be welcomed, a more 
proactive approach can be more effective.
A reactive approach to stakeholder engagement, 
particularly in the context of a crisis situation, 
means attempting to build relationships in a 
context of extremely low trust (International 
Finance Corporation 2009; OECD 2008; Forrer 
et al. 2010). Proactive engagement builds 
goodwill and a sense of cooperation that can 
help if problems arise. It requires an early and 
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consistent involvement of stakeholders such 
as community groups, NGOs, politicians, 
value chain partners and customers, with 
adequate information provided in a meaningful 
format during planning and continuing 
through implementation. By early detection of 
(changing) concerns and interests, PPPPs can 
manage expectations, identify potential issues 
and reduce the risk of conflict and costly crisis 
management. This is particularly true in highly 
visible, prominent projects, which are more 
vulnerable to reputational risks. Accountability 
requirements built into contracts, so that private 
sector partners are open to these measures, and 
strong champions inside the government are 
also important.
Public accountability: The role of brokers
Brokers can support public engagement 
and accountability. Private sector actors 
in particular are less likely to be familiar or 
comfortable with accountability processes, 
which trusted brokers can encourage and 
facilitate.
5.8Facilitate sustainable market systems
There is a risk that the way PPPPs are set 
up undermines long-term viability, if the 
design focuses on the success of the initial 
donor-supported PPPP. Instead the focus 
needs to move beyond donor programmes (or 
corporate social responsibility projects) to create 
sustainable market systems.
To create a sustainable system, there is a need to 
consider how financing in the new institutional 
arrangements developed by the PPPP should 
work long term. In Uganda, the PPPP has 
been designed with commercial operations in 
mind from the start, building in a financing 
mechanism for KOPGT, the intermediary 
between the farmers and the company. 
However, this mechanism is linked to farmer 
loan repayments, meaning that the financing 
will cease once loans are repaid. This situation 
is being reviewed in order to develop a long-
term business and financing plan, considering 
options such as charging for extension or other 
services or taxing fresh fruit bunches marketed 
by farmers. A successful plan will need the 
roles of KOPGT to be clearly defined relative 
to the services it delivers to farmers and to the 
farmers’ association, KOPGA. 
Financing is not the only issue, however. Incentives 
also need to be created for actors to perform new 
roles on an ongoing basis. In Indonesia the Cocoa 
Development Centres (CDCs) and Village Cocoa 
Centres (VCCs) form the new arrangement for 
delivering improved cocoa technology to farmers; 
farmer groups and government extension agents 
are intended to act as the key instruments 
of technology dissemination through these 
structures. Long-term sustainability therefore 
depends on the willingness and ability of these 
actors to carry on these functions. However, at the 
time of the fieldwork, extension agents were not 
strongly engaged, as there are no clear incentives 
for them to specialise in a single commodity, such 
as cocoa, and this remains a challenge. Farmer 
groups, on the other hand, were actively engaged 
– maintaining group seed and experimental 
gardens at the VCC level, encouraged by the 
positive changes in cocoa productivity in the 
demonstration gardens. However, they are 
presently unable to manage the VCCs without 
continued technical support. In response, IFAD 
has initiated a new partnership with the NGO 
Swisscontact, to further strengthen the capacity 
of these groups. 
There is a fine line between piloting new 
approaches or making up-front investments 
(e.g. in farmer organisations and capacity 
building) to support market systems that 
work better for development, and creating 
arrangements that undermine sustainability. 
The key is in focusing interventions on actions 
that modify the incentives, capabilities and 
behaviour of different actors – public and 
private sectors, value chain actors and service 
providers – to ensure they will continue their 
roles in the long run. 
Sustainability: The role of brokers
Brokers can focus attention beyond the 
immediate project, ensuring that actors have 
the long-term capacity, financing and incentives 
to play new roles, even once initial funding and 
support is removed.
They can develop a clear exit strategy. Planning 
for broker exit should start early. Otherwise the 
risk is that brokers become part of how PPPP 
implementation works, creating dependence, 
particularly among the less powerful partners. 
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6 PPPP checklist
Drawing on the enabling factors and the roles 
of brokers identified throughout the research, 
this section provides a ‘PPPP checklist’ for 
partners and brokers involved in the design 
and implementation of PPPPs. The checklist 
is not intended as a blueprint – much of 
the detail of how PPPPs are designed and 
implemented is context-specific, depending on 
the nature of the PPPP, the value chain and 
the partners involved. However, it provides 
guidance in the form of key principles and 
questions, and outlines the support that 
brokers can provide at each step of the PPPP 
process.
PPPP checklist Broker’s role
Prioritise farmer ownership of the PPPP 
• Do farmers’ organisations already exist? 
If so, they should be included in early 
planning and negotiation. If not, then time 
needs to be built in to support development 
of new representative organisations from 
the bottom up.
• Identify capacity building or support that 
farmers’ organisations need to participate in 
the PPPP on more equal terms.
Align incentives of partners
• PPPPs need a shared objective – a common 
outcome that all partners have an interest 
in. All should stand to lose if this objective is 
not achieved. 
• Incentives can also be created or reinforced 
by PPPP design, e.g. contract penalties for 
non-achievement or ensuring dependence 
of companies on smallholder production.
Build trust
• How is power distributed across the PPPP? 
(E.g. this may depend on the structure of 
the value chain and on who exerts control.) 
• Where power is unequal, arrangements 
such as pricing mechanisms, capacity 
building and expert technical support can 
build trust and maintain partner ownership. 
• Trust is also generated when partners 
understand decision-making and perceive it 
to be fair, e.g. quality assessments. 
Manage risks through identification, 
distribution and mitigation
• What are the main risks that partners 
face under the PPPP (e.g. production, 
market, price)? Can these risks be 
managed through PPPP design (e.g. by 
including safety nets, stabilisation funds, 
micro-insurance), or through reallocating 
them more effectively (e.g. linking credit 
repayment to yields)?
• Remaining risks should be distributed fairly, 
considering which parties are best able 
manage them.
Involve farmers 
directly in the 
initial PPPP 
negotiation and 
design.
Build smallholder 
capacity to 
organise 
effectively, 
access 
information and 
negotiate a fair 
deal.
Help partners 
identify benefits 
and common 
objectives.
Help ensure 
transparency 
and dialogue 
to build 
understanding 
between 
different 
organisational 
cultures.
Support weaker 
participants to 
engage in the 
PPPP on more 
equal terms.
Provide or 
procure 
technical 
expertise as 
needed.
Design
PPPP checklist Broker’s role
What is the constraint?
• Establish what constraints 
need to be overcome 
(technology, finance, market 
access, farmer organisation) 
and what skills, resources 
and technical competence 
are needed.
Which private sector 
partner?
• Does the PPPP represent a 
large investment with a single 
company? Is there capacity 
to manage a bidding 
process? Are there likely 
to be good competitors? 
Is the risk of corruption 
(real or perceived) high? If 
so, competitive bidding is 
important. If not, then finding 
an effective partner with 
proven capabilities and a 
good reputation can be more 
effective.
Is a PPPP the right 
solution? 
• Does the public sector 
have the required skills, 
resources and competencies 
to address the constraints 
efficiently and to a high 
quality? 
• If not, are there companies 
that can fill them efficiently 
and effectively? 
• Note, however, that some 
services may not be judged 
on efficiency but other 
criteria such as ethical or 
equity reasons. These are 
best left to the public sector 
rather than PPPPs.
Ask the right 
questions to 
define the 
purpose and 
value of the 
PPPP. 
Facilitate 
contact 
with potential 
company 
partners.
Identify 
and justify 
assumptions.
Ensure 
effective 
feasibility 
studies. 
Rationale
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The checklist is divided into rationale, design, 
implementation and sustainability. Note that 
there is no neatly defined line between design 
and implementation. In many cases, processes 
are developed during design, but their effective 
use depends upon the way they are implemented 
(monitoring or governance mechanisms are 
examples here). However, for the sake of simplicity, 
those elements linked to the way incentives and 
trust are developed between the partners and how 
risk is managed across the PPPP are listed under 
design; while those elements dealing with how the 
PPPP responds to external events and stakeholders 
are listed under implementation.
PPPP checklist Broker’s role
Build the capacity to respond 
to changes in complex market 
systems 
• Indicators should measure progress 
in the shared objective of the PPPP, 
as well as capture other changes at 
the household, community, market 
and environmental level (intended 
or not). 
• Results should be used to adapt the 
PPPP to amplify positive outcomes 
or address negative impacts. 
• Regular meetings between partners 
can review progress and develop 
action plans and implementation 
timetables.
Deal with differences and 
conflicts 
• Spaces should allow disagreements 
or areas of dispute between partners 
to be raised with confidence, and 
addressed. 
• All partners need sufficient 
knowledge and information to 
participate in this dialogue and have 
confidence that their voice will be 
heard.
A proactive approach to public 
accountability and transparency
• PPPP stakeholders need access 
to adequate information about the 
PPPP in a meaningful format, during 
both planning and implementation.
• Spaces are also needed for external 
stakeholders to raise concerns 
related to the PPPP. It will be 
important to show how this dialogue 
affects actual decision-making (such 
that the voices of stakeholders 
are heard). If communication 
is happening but leading to no 
changes, it is only likely to breed 
cynicism.
Support 
and facilitate 
monitoring 
processes.
Create 
spaces for 
and facilitate 
dialogue 
around 
conflicts or 
differences.
Support 
partners to 
develop and 
own joint 
solutions to 
challenges 
identified 
through 
monitoring and 
dialogue.
Encourage 
and facilitate 
processes to 
engage with 
and respond to 
public interests 
in the PPPP.
Implementation
PPPP checklist Broker’s role
What is the sustainability 
strategy for the PPPP? 
• What are the temporary 
arrangements needed in the early 
stages of the PPPP (e.g. capacity 
building arrangements) versus 
those which are intended to 
continue long term (e.g. farmers’ 
organisations, extension services)?
• Is there an exit strategy for the 
short-term arrangements?
• Are the long-term arrangements 
self-sustaining financially (or do 
they depend on subsidies or 
donor funding)? If they are not 
self-sustaining initially, a financing 
or business plan will need to be 
developed.
• Beyond financing, are these 
arrangements sustainable in 
that the actors involved have an 
interest or incentive to remain 
involved after the initial project 
ends?
• Note that planning for long-term 
sustainability needs to start 
during design and be adapted 
and developed through 
implementation. 
Plan for broker exit
• What role(s) do the broker(s) play 
in PPPP implementation (e.g. 
building trust, supporting dialogue, 
building capacity, monitoring and 
evaluation)?
• Which of these need to continue 
after the broker exits (e.g. 
dialogue) versus those which 
might no longer be needed (e.g. 
capacity building)? Will actors 
from within the PPPP perform the 
long-term roles? Are appropriate 
structures and processes in 
place? 
Ensure actors 
have long-term 
capacity, 
financing and 
incentives to 
play new roles.
Brokers also 
need a clear 
exit strategy. 
Sustainability
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 A farmer’s 
cocoa dries 
in the sun.
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 7 Conclusions
Public-private partnerships for development 
have gained substantial currency among 
donors, governments and the private sector, in 
agriculture among other sectors. This research 
takes learnings from the outcomes being 
achieved in four agricultural value chain PPPPs 
brokered in the frame of IFAD-funded projects 
in Ghana, Indonesia, Rwanda and Uganda. It 
provides new insights to support partners and 
brokers to develop agricultural value chain 
PPPPs that contribute to smallholder livelihoods 
and rural development, in the form of eight 
enabling factors, which are listed below.
1. Define the rationale and underlying 
assumptions. PPPPs should have a clear rationale, 
responding to the key questions: ‘what is the 
constraint to be overcome?’ and ‘how will working 
with the private sector overcome this constraint?’. 
Potential partners with the right competencies 
need to be identified, e.g. through competitive 
bidding, partner due diligence processes, or 
working with already established partners. 
Assumptions behind the rationale and proposed 
solutions need to be identified and feasibility tested.
2. Ensure a clear market pull. Value chain 
PPPPs offer the specific opportunity to 
secure market access for smallholder farmers 
by connecting them directly with markets. 
Outcomes will depend on aspects of design, 
including risk-sharing and mechanisms that 
address unequal power relations that exist in 
vertically coordinated value chains.
3. Prioritise farmer ownership of the PPPP. 
The PPPP is a partnership not only of public and 
private sectors but also of farmers. For PPPPs to 
be successful, all partners, including farmers need 
to have ownership of the PPPP, with clear roles 
and responsibilities that reflect their priorities 
and interests. 
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4. Align incentives of partners and build 
trust between the partners. Agreements are 
needed to create incentives for partners to 
perform their intended roles – and to feel 
confident that the other partners will perform 
their roles. Incentives are most fully aligned 
when all partners own the PPPP objectives 
and where each has something to lose if the 
objectives are not achieved. Building trust 
between parties that are not used to working 
together or thinking of each other as partners 
– or who have a history of poor relationships – 
requires significant leadership from within the 
partnership organisations or from brokers.
5. Manage risks through identification, 
distribution and mitigation. Unless risk 
is managed, the weakest value chain actors 
(normally the farmers) bear a disproportionate 
share, and this can also raise costs and 
undermine the sustainability of the PPPP as a 
whole. PPPP design should firstly identify risks 
and how risks are distributed. Mechanisms are 
then needed to manage, mitigate or share risk, 
avoiding an excessive unmitigated risk burden 
on one party. 
6. Build the capacity to respond to changes 
in complex market systems. Agricultural 
markets consist of many individual but 
interdependent parts, with the dynamics of the 
system emerging from interactions between 
these parts. PPPP interventions may lead to 
unforeseen outcomes – challenges as well 
as opportunities. PPPPs need mechanisms 
to identify these changes, and the flexibility 
to respond and adapt to the unexpected. 
This includes performance monitoring, with 
indicators that reflect joint PPPP objectives, and 
spaces for communication, negotiation and 
conflict resolution.
7. Take a proactive approach to public 
accountability and transparency. The 
impacts of PPPPs frequently extend beyond 
direct partners to a wider group of external 
stakeholders. The larger the scale of PPPP 
activities and its likely impacts, the more 
important it is to proactively identify and 
address negative externalities, engaging and 
involving potentially affected stakeholders.  
8. Facilitate sustainable market systems. 
Agricultural value chain PPPPs are time-limited 
interventions to establish new markets, 
institutional or systemic arrangements that 
address underlying constraints in areas such as 
input markets, credit systems and technology 
diffusion. Interventions need to focus on actions 
that modify the incentives, capabilities and 
behaviour of different actors to ensure they will 
continue their roles in the long term. 
Discussion of findings
While the four case studies point overall to 
the potential for PPPPs to deliver positive 
development outcomes, the jury is still out in 
terms of the long-term impacts on poverty and 
rural development. Most of the projects are 
still mid-way through implementation, and the 
value chain relationships and arrangements 
that are being developed need to operate over 
a longer time frame before their impacts can be 
properly judged. This is especially true for crops 
that require considerable upfront investment 
before results are realised. 
This evidence gap is not particular to IFAD. 
A recent informal survey across the Donor 
Committee for Economic Development 
member agencies confirmed the need for more 
information and clarity around the approaches 
used in public-private partnerships to measure 
results, the outcomes of impact assessments, and 
good practice principles for donor engagement 
and results measurement (Heinrich 2013). Many 
of the criticisms of PPPPs and other value chain 
approaches are linked to perceptions that claims 
of positive outcomes are not substantiated by the 
evidence. As a result, some business leaders have 
also recognised the need for better and more 
consistent indicators of progress, and credible 
evidence on results of ‘inclusive business’54 
initiatives (Sustainable Food Lab 2015).
Despite this recognition of the evidence gap 
from some of the business community, it 
is ultimately the role of the public sector, 
including donors, to invest in creating a solid 
evidence base that identifies the impacts 
of PPPPs over the long term. This includes 
building systems and processes for monitoring 
and evaluation of PPPPs from the beginning, 
but also supporting long-term evaluations, 
including several years after the initial 
development project has ended. Evaluations 
(short- and long-term) need to consider the 
sustainability of changes identified, how they 
are embedded in institutions, whether market 
actors have changed their behaviour and the 
commercial viability of arrangements (Ruffer 
and Wach 2013). Impact evaluation should also 
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measure broader impacts (positive and negative) 
beyond participating farmers.
Despite this evidence gap, PPPPs remain 
popular among bilateral and multilateral 
donors, as well as some companies and 
developing country governments, as 
mechanisms that seek to increase private 
investment in agriculture in ways that can 
better include small-scale producers. Yet this 
research suggests that the involvement of public 
and private actors is not, in itself, enough to 
achieve commercially-viable business models 
with improved outcomes for farmers. In fact 
one of the unexpected results was that strong 
government ownership of the PPPP, such as 
in Uganda and Rwanda, did not emerge as 
an enabling factor to improve the livelihoods 
of farmers, which depends more on the way 
the PPPP is designed, including especially the 
role of the ‘fourth P’ – producers. However, in 
these two countries, government investment in 
infrastructure was highlighted as important by 
both farmers in the PPPP and non-participating 
community members. This suggests that more 
focus in agricultural PPPPs could be placed 
on this type of broader, horizontal impact 
generated directly as a result of the government’s 
role, which can benefit those who are unlikely 
to be reached by private sector value chains.
Involving the private sector did not guarantee 
the long-term commercial viability of the 
arrangements. On reflection, this finding is 
not entirely a surprise, since sustainability 
and scalability are also challenges for many 
company-led ‘inclusive business’ approaches. 
Including poor producers in formal value chains 
is a complex task with constraints related to 
lack of infrastructure, low levels of skills and 
knowledge, and high transaction costs (to 
name a few), which create significant practical 
difficulties. The risk with both company-led 
and PPPP approaches is that the effort invested 
to ensure the success of pilot projects can 
undermine the ability to reach commercial scale. 
This is particularly challenging in ‘greenfield’ 
interventions, such as the PPPP in Uganda, 
which supports smallholders to enter new value 
chains, compared to initiatives that improve 
the terms on which smallholders are already 
engaging in markets (Vorley and Thorpe 2014). 
In this respect, the PPPP in Ghana – although 
not without challenges – offers a promising 
model since it works through already existing 
market systems, influencing the behaviour of 
different market actors (through partnerships 
but also other modes of engagement) in 
overcoming constraints faced by farmers. 
Approaches that work to improve existing market 
systems offer the potential for large-scale impact 
through reaching diffuse beneficiaries, and may 
not require such heavy financial and technical 
support at the pilot stage, with the inherent risk 
of failing to move to commercial scale. 
The challenge of more diffuse market systems 
approaches, however, is the complexity of 
measuring impact and attributing it to programme 
interventions (creating further difficulties in 
developing a credible evidence base). The link 
between intervention and impact is generally not 
linear, and impacts may be spread across a wide 
area, number and types of beneficiaries, rather 
than easily identifiable within a single company 
value chain. That said, there are methodologies 
that can support evaluation of more ‘systemic’ 
changes that are taking place, and increasing 
guidance is available on measuring results and 
attribution in these contexts.55 
Overall, the conclusion is that agricultural value 
chain PPPPs are a variation on, rather than 
a radical departure from, other value chain 
approaches, bringing similar opportunities 
for small-holder producers, but also similar 
challenges. The enabling factors and PPPP 
checklist set out in this report support partners 
and brokers to design and implement PPPPs 
in ways that can lead to better development 
outcomes for both communities and producers. 
More evidence is still needed, however, around the 
long-term impacts of PPPPs for both smallholder 
livelihoods and broader rural development.
 Tea leaves in 
a basket after 
collection.
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Summary of outcomes identified and links to PPPP design and implementation
Key outcomes Links between outcomes and PPPP
Ghana • Improved access to inputs and services leading to improved 
yields (from 0.8 MT/ha/yr in 2008 on average to 1.5–3.2 MT/
ha/yr in 2014)56
• Improvements in incomes and livelihoods in some cases, 
though income stability has not improved
• Improved household food security 
• High exposure to production risk, accompanied by loan 
defaults
• Women largely felt excluded from activities
• DVCCs and cashless credit system translate to 
increased farm yields 
• Improved income and food security linked to 
surplus maize from greater productivity and 
stronger market linkages; however, high cost 
of inputs negates income improvements in 
some cases
• Poor price negotiation process negatively 
affects incomes and income stability
• Training in food safety improves quality of 
maize consumed 
• Lack of risk mitigation measures means risk 
exposure is high
Indonesia57 • Cocoa plant rehabilitation and improved productivity and 
quality. In 2010 productivity was 50kg per tree per month, 
but is now up to 100–200kg per tree per month58
• Women’s participation in farm activities has increased to 17 
per cent, compared to 5 per cent in control villages – though 
benefit to women is not established59
• Improved farmer technical knowledge and 
inputs have led to productivity and quality 
gains. However, more time is needed for most 
farmers to see benefits following grafting or 
planting
• Gender impacts were not specifically 
considered in PPPP design
Rwanda • Green leaf yields increased from 0.1T/ha/year in 2011 to 
0.7T/ha/year in 2013 in Nshili, and to 2.5T/ha/year in 2013 in 
Mushubi
• New employment opportunities created on tea plantations 
and in the two new factories. Up to 40 per cent of the 
working labour force in the tea regions used to migrate, now 
others are coming to seek opportunities
• Farmers report stability in incomes, and improved food security 
• Farmers able to meet basic health and education needs, and 
invest in assets such as livestock. For example, 84 per cent 
of tea growers in Mushubi and 80 per cent in Nshili were 
affiliated to medical health insurance (Mutuelle de Santé) for 
the first time 60
• Economic transformation, with small business creation and 
expansion of business centres
• Current productivity levels are insufficient for loans to be 
sustainable
• Income improvements from yield 
improvements, selling green leaves and 
working in the factories 
• Women have been specifically targeted, and 
have also benefited
• General economic transformation from 
investment in infrastructure (roads, electricity 
grid and water facilities)
• The PPPP targeted women’s inclusion with 
provisions for 30 per cent of tea growers to be 
women 
• Poor assumptions about productivity and 
inadequate risk mitigation measures have 
created potentially unsustainable loan burden
Uganda • Average yields have reportedly been high, with trees in their 
sixth year yielding up to 15 tonnes per hectare per year;61 
however, this has been followed by a general drop in yields, 
attributable to three years of low rainfall
• Improved income stability, enabling people to meet basic 
health and education needs, and invest in assets (livestock, 
vehicles, farm assets) (14 out of 47 peers reported acquiring 
assets directly from the PPPP and 25 acquired assets indirectly)
• Improved food security reported
• Women comprise one third of farmer leadership positions 
and 35 per cent of beneficiaries62 
• Improved land tenure security for participating farmers. At the 
beginning of the PPPP, 77 per cent were Kibanja tenants with 
less than three acres of land and no outright land ownership. 
Today tenants have had their land surveyed and recorded; 
however, land conflicts also reported by 35 of 43 female 
farmers and 55 of 58 male farmers
• Economic transformation, with new investment in business activity, 
e.g. in construction and tourism, and a second financial institution
• Employment opportunities created in the palm oil mill and 
plantation – though largely filled through migrant labour
• Farmers report better environmental management 
and awareness but there are also persistent reports of 
encroachment on lake shore buffer zone and clearance of 
forests on private land
• Farmer loans during pre-harvest phase 
contribute to incomes, income stability and 
household assets
• A number of risks (e.g. production risk) have 
been managed, e.g. through linking loan 
repayment to yield
• Livelihood opportunities designed to include 
women 
• Intercropping in early years improved food 
security, but becomes a problem once 
trees mature and intercropping is no longer 
possible63
• Land conflicts as a result of rising land 
pressure/land prices,64 particularly as some 
absentee landlords have begun to return 
• General economic transformation from 
investment in infrastructure (roads, ferry, 
electricity)
• Employment created mostly filled by migrant 
labour creating social pressures on island, e.g. 
on health, education and water
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 Endnotes
1 Adapted from definition of public-private 
partnership in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The 
Netherlands, 2013.
2  See for example www.beamexchange.org/en/
guidance/measuring-results/
3 IFAD has also published its own experiences 
in working with public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development 2013), and these two publications 
together seek to document and share IFAD’s 
learning on PPPs, with the aim of improving 
development outcomes.
4 For example, evidence of early forms of state 
advancement and dissemination of agricultural 
information dates back to imperial China, 
where the state was concerned with improving 
revenues from land taxes (Swanson et al. 1997).
5 Adapted from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
The Netherlands, 2013
6 In the context of the report, structured or 
semi-structured process refers to those PPPPs 
that were designed as such, and where an active 
search for private sector partners was conducted, 
such as a bidding process, private sector 
outreach or marketing surveys. There may be 
joint venture or tripartite agreements between 
farmers and companies. 
7 An unstructured/opportunistic process refers 
to those PPPPs that responded to a need or 
seized an opportunity to build linkages between 
existing programmes and private sector partners, 
which did not follow a planned process. 
8 Armenia had been selected as a case to 
represent PPPPs aimed at financial sector 
development, but due to internal constraints, the 
research was ultimately not able to take place.
9 During the initial research framing, preliminary 
interviews were held with 14 individuals involved 
in PPPs from NGO, academic/expert, farmer, 
business and multilateral sectors. Following the 
fieldwork, the initial findings were reviewed 
at an international workshop involving 34 
representatives from the case study countries and 
international community, including from donor, 
NGO, academic, public and private sectors. 
10 A more detailed report is also available for 
each of the four country case studies.  These 
can be accessed via www.ids.ac.uk/publication/
brokering-development.
11 The case study can be found at: 
www.ids.ac.uk/publication/ifad-public-private- 
partnership-ghana-case-study
12 Savannah Farmers Marketing Company is 
a registered private limited company with five 
staff. It was established in 2005 by ICCO (the 
Netherlands-based inter-church organisation 
for development cooperation) and ACDEP, a 
network of church-based NGOs in Ghana. These 
two organisations are the main stakeholders 
in SFMC, and are holding shares in trust for 
farmers, as it is envisaged the company will 
become farmer-owned in the future. 
13  Yields in 2007 are based on NRGP baseline 
data. Yields in 2014 are based on estimates 
reported during focus group discussions.
14 Some participating farmers reported increases 
in assets such as motorcycles and mobile 
phones, and are investing in livestock.
15 The case study can be found at: 
www.ids.ac.uk/publication/ifad-public-private-
partnership-indonesia-case-study
16 For example, during 2005–06, farmers could 
produce as much as 400kg to 500kg per tree per 
month.
17 The case study can be found at: 
www.ids.ac.uk/publication/ifad-public-private-
partnership-rwanda-case-study
18 In Nshili, a tea plantation (formerly 
government-run) already existed but there was 
no factory. Green leaves that were produced had 
to be processed at a factory 52km away, and 
roads were in an extremely bad condition. In 
Mushubi, tea was introduced for the first time 
through the programme.
19 The World Bank devised this national 
pricing system for Rwanda. Prices are based 
on a percentage of the made-tea price (at 4.3 
conversion rate, i.e. 4.3kg of green leaves to 1kg 
of made tea). Gradually, the green leaves price 
will increase from 35 per cent (July 2012), 40 
per cent (July 2013), 45 per cent (July 2014), 
and 50 per cent (July 2015) of auction prices 
until 2017. Should the international auction 
price fall, a national minimum average price 
set by the government should apply (at least 
RWF100–105/kg of green leaves). 
20 In Mushubi, the Tea Factory is owned by Nile 
Tea Company (NTC) a consortium made of 
the private investor (70 per cent of shares), the 
cooperative (15 per cent) and the government 
(15 per cent). In Nshili, the tea factory is owned 
by Nshili-Kivu Tea Plantation Company, also 
a consortium (85 per cent of shares) and the 
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cooperative (15 per cent).
21 Tea growers have acquired dairy cows and small 
animals (goats, pigs, chickens) in both Nshili and 
Mushubi, which are both contributing to food 
security and providing manure as fertiliser.
22  From a baseline of zero, 84 per cent of tea 
growers in Mushubi and 80 per cent in Nshili now 
have health insurance (through the Mutuelle de 
Santé). In Mushubi, the President of COTHEGAB, 
who is also a health official, confirmed that 
the cooperative mobilises its members around 
health issues (vaccination, sanitation, hygiene, 
reproductive health issues).
23 The number of households in Mushubi eating 
three meals a day increased from 4 per cent to 9 
per cent between 2004 and 2010. In Nshili they 
increased from 5 per cent to 10 per cent in Nshili. 
24 747ha in Nshili and 937ha in Mushubi.
25 Other factors include high altitude, poor ability 
of soil to retain water, use of a low-yield tea 
clone (which accounts for 70 per cent of the area 
planted), and insufficient knowledge on pest and 
disease control.
26 Farmers are expected to start serving their loan 
at year three, for an eight-year period at 8.5 per cent 
interest rate, based on yields of 6–7T/ha/yr. Measures 
are now being taken to try to address these risks.
27 This was a new issue at the time of the fieldwork, 
and the government and investor were about to 
start negotiations to address the matter.
28  The case study can be found at: 
www.ids.ac.uk/publication/
ifad-public-private-partnership-uganda-case-study
29 Bidco is a Kenyan multinational company 
producing consumer goods. Bidco Uganda Limited 
(BUL) is a partnership between Bidco and three 
other multinationals: Wilmar International, 
Josovina, and Archer Daniels Midlands (ADM).
30 According to KOPGT. Women are also reported to 
make up one-third of farmer leadership positions.
31 An estimated 3,000 jobs have been created by 
the PPPP, although this includes jobs in the factory 
at Jinja, as well as in Kalangala, according to the 
Completion Report produced by the government at 
the end of phase 1 of the programme.
32 From UGX150,000 per acre in 2002 to 
UGX800,000 in 2008.
33 Around two-thirds of participants in the focus 
groups reported greater incidence of land conflicts 
since the introduction of oil palm.
34 However, not all farmers have benefited from 
increased yields, because of circumstances that 
range from poor crop management to poor 
soil quality to begin with, and limited access to 
training services provided.
35 In Uganda, yields have generally been good on 
average, but vary between farmers.
36 In Rwanda, farmers are expected to start serving 
their loan at year three, for an eight-year period at 
a rate of 8.5 per cent interest. In Uganda, farmers 
are expected to start serving their loan once 
harvesting begins, from approximately year three, 
at 10 per cent. Deductions are in instalments of 33 
per cent of each monthly harvest, over an eight to 
ten year period depending on the yield.
37 Local spot market traders are reportedly 
differentiating maize as a spillover of the training 
on post-harvest practices and food safety provided 
to participating smallholder farmers. Some farmers 
sorted the maize they sold on the local spot markets 
using the practices taught at the PPP training 
sessions, and attracted a 20 per cent price premium.
38 This rationale is based on an analysis of the 
case study in the light of the literature, rather 
than stated project goals or a theory of change. 
It focuses on the rationale from the perspective 
of why a PPPP was needed, rather than all of the 
objectives of the IFAD programme.
39 There was also a marketing component in 
Ghana, but at the level of smallholders. This was 
primarily linked to enhanced access to credit, 
rather than market access per se. However, the PPPP 
did build market linkages further downstream to 
strengthen the value chain (see page 31).
40  The original Mars training module includes 
four weeks of technical training and two weeks 
of business training, which is 25 per cent theory 
and 75 per cent practical. In the PPPP this is 
compressed into four days, which is 75 per cent 
in class (theoretical) and 25 per cent in field 
(practical) training. 
41  The exception is Indonesia, although in the 
next phase of the programme, as trust between 
partners has been established, a marketing 
component is being introduced.
42 While up to 40 per cent of working labour force 
in the PPPP areas used to migrate in the quest of 
seasonal labour, farmers reported that seasonal 
migration has stopped and other rural poor are 
coming to the PPPP areas to seek opportunities as 
a result of tea development and factory presence.
43  The formula is expressed as ffb=(H/J) x K where 
ffb is the farm gate price per tonne of fresh fruit 
bunches of a standard quality; H is the price of 
crude palm oil ex-mill; K is the oil extraction rate 
per tonne; and J is a constant. The oil extraction 
rate normally varies between 18 and 23 per cent 
and is highly sensitive to the quality of harvested 
ffbs, as well as the speed and efficiency of delivery 
to the mill after harvest. The constant reflects 
the costs involved in palm oil processing and 
is normally understood to be in the range of 
1.15–1.25, depending on the efficiency of plant 
management. Bidco applies 1.25. 
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44  The Ophir smallholder oil palm project, part 
of the government of Indonesia’s Nucleus Estate 
Smallholder (NES) programme. It is an 8,000ha 
oil palm plantation, with 4,800ha managed 
by smallholders and 3,200ha managed by the 
nucleus estate (Jelsma et al. 2009). 
45 This model also created a sense of peer 
pressure among farmers, which helped convince 
smallholders to maintain high standards in their 
fields.
46 Where the public sector partner does not 
understand private sector capabilities and 
motives, this can lead to adverse selection 
(Poulton and Macartney 2012).
47  However, risks clearly still remain, e.g. low 
yields due to poor quality soils or poor crop 
management could create difficulties with loan 
repayment, and lead to farmer defaults.
48 Farmers are expected to start serving their loan 
after three years, based on an assumption of 
green leaf yields of 6T/ha/year. National yield 
average is 7T/ha. While yields display an upward 
trend, they are still far below this target – standing 
at between 0.7T/ha/year and 2.5T/ha/year in 2013.
49  There are many factors contributing to the 
relatively low yields. At Nshili, this is due to poor 
tea bush care prior to privatisation, a high vacancy 
rate (after infilling, new bushes have low yield 
in first few years), high altitude, poor ability of 
soil to retain water, and use of a low-yield tea 
clone (which accounts for 70 per cent of the area 
planted). In addition there has been inadequate 
application of fertiliser by farmers; insufficient 
knowledge on pest and disease control and 
irregularities in executing basic crop husbandry 
practices (weeding, pruning and plucking). At 
Mushubi, production constraints include limited 
use of fertiliser (due to a complicated and lengthy 
procurement system and transport delays) 
and lack of casual labour at peak times (many 
labourers opt for potato production). 
50 However, recent default rates among farmer-
based organisations following poor weather are 
once again undermining trust and willingness of 
rural banks to commit fully.
51 See Sustainable Food Labs (2015) for one 
attempt to develop common indicators for 
smallholder performance measurement by a 
group of companies, standards organisations, 
NGOs and development agencies. 
52 On 19 February 2015, a group of more 
than 100 farmers filed a lawsuit against Bidco 
Uganda and the landowner who leased the 
land to the company, claiming they were 
evicted from their land illegally and were paid 
little or no compensation [www.theguardian.
com/global-development/2015/mar/03/
ugandan-farmers-take-on-palm-oil-giants-over-
land-grab-claims]. 
53 The study was undertaken in 2002, finding that 
the concessions were justified as the benefits in 
terms of foreign exchange savings, employment 
and poverty reduction were considered to 
outweigh the cost to government in lost tax 
revenues.
54 ‘Inclusive business’ is a general term for 
business-led approaches that are designed 
to reach and improve the lives of the poor, 
particularly as producers who are introduced 
into new value chains or who have the terms in 
which their involvement in existing value chains 
improved. It also includes initiatives that improve 
the lives of the poor as consumers or as wage 
labour.
55 See for example www.beamexchange.org/en/
guidance/measuring-results/
56 Based on estimates during FGDs.
57 Note that the outcomes that the research was able 
to attribute to the PPPP were limited, as many of 
the broader household and community benefits are 
linked to the wider READ programme, and not only 
to the activities of the PPPP.
58 However, yields are still below maximum 
potential. Cocoa yield in Indonesia in 2000 was 
561kg/ha, with the potential to be as high as about 
1.5 tonnes per hectare (based on FAO data).
59 The research did not establish whether women 
received income benefits from the additional 
work, and whether the work was creating a 
benefit or a burden for women alongside other 
(care) responsibilities.
60 Evaluation de l’Impact du Projet de 
Développement des Cultures de Rente et 
d’Exportation (PDCRE), 01/01/2004 to 
31/12/2009, CIBLE sarl; April 2010.
61 Yields of this level would normally be expected 
only in the ninth year. IFAD, Vegetable Oil 
Development Project – Phase 2. Supervision 
Report, 23 September – 4 October 2013.
62 According to KOPGT.
63 While the project recommended that each 
farmer designates some of their land for food 
production, many farmers reportedly cleared all 
of their land, since there was a monetary value 
attached to the size of land a farmer cleared. 
Concerns were expressed during focus group 
discussions about long-term food security, 
especially once the oil palm trees become too 
large to allow intercropping. Some individuals 
who were no longer able to intercrop reported 
food shortages already.
64 The value of land rose from 150,000 Ugandan 
shillings per acre in 2002 to 800,000 shillings in 
2008.
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